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Abstract 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was in a state of war from 1992 to 1995, after declaring 
independence from Yugoslavia. In 1995, the painstakingly negotiated General Framework 
Agreement for Peace (GFAP) ended the violence. GFAP included a new constitution, with 
strong consociational elements. Inherent in the consociational, or power-sharing school of 
thought, is a conception of what elements are required to ensure a stable and functional 
democracy. Moreover, consociational theory suggests a development where ethnic division 
lines decrease in importance over time, thus ensuring enhanced stability over time. The 
trajectory proffered by consociational theory provides a model against which I posit data with 
regards to democratic quality and reconciliation. The analysis draws upon original data 
within the field of Law and Elections alongside a range of secondary sources. The thesis 
utilises nuanced tools of analysis, intended to address more directly society as it is 
experienced for the citizen rather than a structural, top-down analysis. The conclusion makes 
an assessment of democratic quality and degree of reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
pertaining to the chosen variables. As a project, it demonstrates one way of analysing a 
power-sharing, post-conflict society, using theory that aims to be responsive to citizen´s 
experiences. The conclusions regarding reconciliation and democratic quality in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina constitute reason for serious concern, and on most variables there seems to be 
little developments towards the positive. Such concern has been voiced before, but often 
without being paired with concrete data, or with data pertaining only to a narrow area of 
society. The ambition of this study is to provide nuanced assessments of a conceptually wide-
ranging set of variables, based on concrete evidence, on realms that seem could prove 
important and fruitful to measure in other post-conflict societies as well.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, or BiH1, is a much-studied post-conflict society. It can be used as a 
case of many things: of constitution making after war, of successes and errors of international 
intervention, of mechanisms of ethnic conflict, of religious underpinnings of war, of 
nationalist myth-mongering, or of the upsurge of intra-state conflict after the end of the Cold 
War. In short, if BiH fascinates you, there is a broad array of angles you could write from. 
Most of them will, however, have to do with war. In particular, with the last war that was 
fought here. Ask a person what their first association is when you say “Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”. The answer will likely be: War. By that, they most probably mean the war 
following BiH´s declaration of independence from Yugoslavia. 
The war lasting from 1992-1995 is slowly becoming distant, or at least not so recent 
past. The peace agreement signed 18 years ago ended the use of violence, and lay foundations 
for the daily functioning of the BiH as a state. But Bosnia and Herzegovina is in trouble. The 
unrest in February 2014 can be seen as a sign of unease and discontent with the political 
system. Ethnically based tensions continue to be discernable. In BiH, it seems possible to 
question the degree reconciliation between the three main groups, as well as what 
characterizes the working of the central government. The research question of this project is 
posed as follows:  
 
What	  developments	  can	  be	  discerned	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina	  regarding	  
democratic	  quality	  and	  reconciliation?	  	  
 
1.1 Theoretical concepts informed by consociational 
visions 
Democracy and reconciliation are, I will argue, virtues that consociationalism as a school of 
thought supposes will stem from its set of tools. Consociationalism, or power sharing, is a 
realm of theory with roots in the late 1960´s. Scholars within the tradition have highly 
divided societies as their universe, and the aim of the theory is to reduce tension between 
groups over time. The idea is that removing competitive features as much as possible can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The abbreviation will be used more than the full name throughout the thesis.  
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alleviate anxieties and hostilities in fragmented societies. This should be done, it is argued, by 
creating tools of power sharing, so that different groups feel confident that they are 
represented in decision-making processes (Lijphart 1969). The founding father of this school 
is often considered to be Arend Lijphart. He believed in the possibility of having deeply 
divided societies that still were functioning democracies. Such a society should have four 
features: 1) a power-sharing government, or a so-called grand coalition, with representatives 
from all groups, 2) minority veto on important issues, 3) proportionality in civil service and 
in the electoral system, and 4) ethnic autonomy (Lijphart 1977). 
Power sharing theories constitute an evolving tradition. A much-seen exercise is to 
make use of empirical evidence to develop the tradition, as well as explore differences 
between consociationalism and competing traditions (Sisk 1996; Wolff and Yakinthou 2012; 
McGarry and O`Leary 2004). Several scholars have considered Bosnia and Herzegovina after 
Dayton as a case of consociationalist democracy (Kasapovic 2005; Belloni 2004). Others 
have coined it as a democracy that has elements from several traditions  (Caspersen 2004; 
Bose 2002). One has described BiH as a case of “excessive consociationalism” (Weller 
2010:302), due to the many veto rules and the high degree of power sharing present in all 
levels. The description is accompanied by claims that this holds explanatory power for why 
BiH is a struggling as a state in general. I agree with the characterisation of BiH as a power-
sharing democracy. Hence, visions in power-sharing theories are relevant when assessing 
data findings. This will be justified in Chapter 2.  
1.2 Overview 
This project is a theory-guided case study (Levy 2008:4). It compares data to a theoretical 
framework derived from power-sharing theory. Having travelled to Sarajevo three times in 
the course of the past 8 months, I have collected data on four variables: laws, elections, 
schools and minority returns. The methods used are mixed. Reports, statistics from various 
organisations as well as interviews are, in short, the methods that have been used. I have 
conducted longitudinal measurements on the law, election and minority returns variables, to 
measure development. For schools, the focus is less on development and more on the status 
quo. This is mainly due to the lack of any aggregate data. My main source for this variable is 
interviews. The interviewees all showed a preference for addressing the last four-five years. 
As assessment of development during the last 18 years with regards to schools thus seems 
unfeasible.  
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The recent months of unrest will serve as a reference point in the analyses, in the 
sense that they should make sense in the conclusion that is given. A causal analysis for the 
unrest will not be provided – this is a separate project entirely, requiring a theoretical 
framework with theories on social movements. Thus, the February 2014 unrest should merely 
be viewed as useful auxiliary evidence. Note also that visions inherent in consociational 
theory mainly create a framework. No meticulous matching exercise is in line. 
1.3 Structure 
The remainder of this introduction will contain history about relations between the groups in 
BiH, as well as an introduction to the last war in BiH between 1992 and 1995. After this, 
there will be a presentation of technical aspects in the GFAP, and how this relates to concepts 
of consociationalism. After some paragraphs about the February 2014 unrest, I then define 
central terms and concepts in the thesis. This is followed by a list of words and abbreviations. 
A paragraph about my personal point of departure rounds off the chapter. 
Chapter 2 is where the theoretical framework will be presented. Necessary ingredients 
are introduction to consociationalism, as well as a discussion about whether or not the Dayton 
Accords can be regarded as a case of consociational democracy. After this, I will draw on 
theoretical contributions to provide a framework for assessing democratic quality, as well as 
reconciliation. 
Chapter 3 situates the thesis in a methodological universe. Ingredients will be case 
study as a genre, the specific type of case study design I have chosen, as well as the question 
of what universe my conclusions pertain to. Central methodological concepts will be 
discussed in relation to the project. Moving on, I justify the choice of variables. The 
paragraphs about how data was gathered and analysed will, in addition to more direct 
references, provide insight into how the thesis is situated in relation to methodological 
concepts. 
Chapter 4 through 7 are devoted to empiry. Each independent variable gets a chapter 
of its own, with preliminary analyses provided for each one. 
Chapter 8 is devoted to discussion, structured by the initial research question and 
theoretical framework. 
Conclusions are presented in Chapter 9. 
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1.4 Brief history of groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The history of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been characterized by the coexistence and 
conflict of three groups: The predominantly Roman-Catholic Croats, the predominantly 
Russion-Orthodox Serbs, and the predominantly Muslim Bosniacs (from now on: Serbs, 
Croats and Bosniacs). The groups have had different preferred or given names through 
history, and alliances as well as transitions in power structures have influenced definitions 
and self-definitions. These separate identities have roots back to the 11th century, when a 
unitary Christian faith separated into Eastern and Western forms of Christianity. Identities 
gradually became the source of division lines. For example, these can be discerned in the 
history of (the area now known as) BiH under Ottoman Empire (1463-1878) reign. Through 
historical processes, religious differences slowly morphed into cultural categories. The 
different political formations that ruled over (the area now known as) BiH from the mid 
1400s to the end of the 20th century had a large impact on this process. The Muslims had their 
political and religious allegiance with the Ottoman Empire, Catholics with the Austro-
Hungarian monarchy (1878-1918), and Serbs with Yugoslavia (1918-1992). Other 
monarchical and/or medieval formations, either present or past, that each group could look to 
were also influential. The area that now constitutes Bosnia and Herzegovina had once been 
an independent medieval state, but only for a short while, and its borders were different than 
they are today (Hronesova 2012:31). To generalize the above, one group often supported the 
state formation that ruled, whereas the two others were adversaries of the rule. Divisions 
were recognized and institutionalized in different ways through times of foreign rule. 
Examples are the millet system under the Ottomans, the system of political confessionalism 
based on principles of parity and proportionality under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and 
the “national key” quota system in communist Yugoslavia (Malcolm 1996:148-149).  
Building on the above, the cultural categories of Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs will be denoted 
as ethnic groups in this thesis. A more elaborate discussion of the term ”ethnic” can be found 
below, but for now, ethnicity can be viewed as a social phenomenon, with a framework of 
us/them-thinking  (Calhoun 1994:2). I should also mention that the territory that is now BiH 
has been (and is) also inhabited by non-Slavic groups such as Roma, Romanians, Albanians, 
as well as Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews  (Malcolm 1996:113). However, because the 
Constitution given by GFAP treats Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs as constituent people, and 
because it was these groups that formed the basis for the three main warring factions during 
the 1992-1995 war, this paragraph is only about them and their coexistence with each other. 
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World War I and the subsequent creation of an all-South-Slavic state fostered the first serious 
clashes between Serbian and Croatian identities. Between the World Wars, there was 
substantial tension between all three groups. With World War II, cleavages deepened as 
people chose sides and mass atrocities were committed (Hronesova 2012). This war in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina saw ethnic cleansing, the establishment of concentration camps, and 
targeting of civilians based on ethno-confessional and political affiliation. According to 
Hronesova, the “Hobbesian nature of World War II substantially lacerated the delicate fabric 
of ethno-confessional relations in Yugoslavia” (2012:35). The landscape of who sided with 
whom is difficult to summarize, because of its complexity. As Malcolm points out, there 
were plenty of Muslims in some Ustase factions. Cetniks were, most of the time, against the 
Germans, but in some areas joined ranks with them. In fact, you could at times find all three 
identities represented in a single armed group (1996:ch.13). Most people had nothing to do 
with armed factions. Still, stereotypes have it that all Croats were Ustasa, and that all Serbs 
were Cetniks. Muslims had fought on all sides – Ustasa, German, Cetnik and Partisan, so it 
was harder to frame a stereotype pertaining to them. The partisans were the only warring 
faction that was never allied with the Germans, and they came out of the war in control of 
state power, forming Yugoslavia  (Malcolm 1996:190-192). However, a sign of just how 
deeply seated enemy pictures from the Second World War were, is how they during the 90`s 
resurfaced as, absurd, but forceful, material for creating fear and mobilizing the population  
(Malcolm 1996:206, 214, 216, 217). 
During the period of socialist Yugoslavia, religion and all religious traditions as part 
of public life were banned. National identities instead fell into a three-tiered system of 
nations (narodni), nationalities (narodnosti or nacionalnosti) and other ethnic groups and 
minorities (manjine). In the beginning of Yugoslavias existence, only Serbs and Croats made 
it to be defined as narodni. Although they marked a distinct category in society, Muslims 
were not regarded as a nation in BiH until 1971. Before this, the Bosnian Muslims either 
went for the category of “undefined”, or they chose whatever category seemed suitable at the 
moment  (Hronesova 2012:36-39). The idea of the “Yugoslav person” was important during 
the era from 1945-1990, with an atheist education systems and a public worship of the 
Partisans, who were presented as symbols of unity and Yugoslav consensus and coexistence. 
Considerable effort was put into creating a common language: Serbo-Croatian. Former 
Partisans held almost all positions of power. Nationalism – at least Serbian or Croatian 
nationalism - was unacceptable  (Mønnesland 2006:219-228). In schools, pupils learnt both 
Latin and Cyrillic scripts, and textbooks were printed in both. The content in the curriculum 
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was more or less the same throughout BiH (Low-Beer 2001). Tone Bringa, among others, 
claims that the school system in Yugoslavia was an important instrument with which to roll 
the population into central ideas about the Yugoslav state, perhaps even “the most powerful 
agent of Yugoslav state communism” (Bringa 1995:75). Although there were tensions in the 
Yugoslav society, especially between centralists and decentralists, it seems safe to say that 
for the majority of citizens, the time from 1945 to the late 1980´s was marked by low levels 
of tension between groups. However, considerable collective memory, especially from the 
two World Wars, constituted a dormant, but forceful reservoir of myths and ideological back 
up. This became highly visible during the late 1980´s and early 1990´s. 
What conclusions can we draw from this history of complex coexistence? There has 
been scholarly work claiming that there was a consociational type of coexistence during 
Yugoslavia (Goldman 1985; Vasovic 1992) – this addresses one of the state/imperial periods 
referred to above. However, using consociational concepts to analyse an authoritarian state 
seems a puzzling project, considering that a basic premise in the power-sharing model is 
democracy (Lijphart 1969). Croatian professor Mirjana Kasapovic argues that the three 
groups in the (area now known as) BiH has a history of consociational mechanisms in its 
political coexistence dating back to the 15th century, although this should not be confused 
with a “genuinely enduring, coherent and conscious tradition of consociational democracy” 
(Kasapovic 2005:7-8). The history of all places, peoples and events, consists of a wild 
number of facts that can be arranged every which way, to play its part in an array of 
narratives – a phenomenon well known to historians. I will not conclude this paragraph with 
a claim that BiH has some deep consociational tradition in its history. However, it seems 
reasonable to say that history, as it has played out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has a common 
denominator of coexistence between groups that have been very different in religious, and 
increasingly also cultural, terms.  
1.5 The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The emergence of the post-Yugoslav state of Bosnia and Herzegovina came about through a 
violent break-up of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia disintegrated gradually following Tito´s death in 
1980. Power vacuum, economic decline and the fall of the Soviet Union were all factors 
pushing the development forward. When Croatia and Slovenia got their independence, the 
leaders of BiH felt they didn´t have a choice but to declare independence as well. The 
alternative would be to remain in a Serb dominated Yugoslavia. But when the president of 
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the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, declared independence 20. 
December 1991, a majority of Bosnian Serbs reacted with hostility, as they feared oppression  
(Nystuen 2005:36).  Moreover, Serbs both within and outside BiH saw a possibility for 
achieving a “greater Serbia” by pursuing an aggressive policy in BiH. Bosnian Croats had 
similar visions  (Nystuen 2005:36-37). Both fear and greed can thus be traced as motivational 
factors on the Serb and Croat sides. Most sources about sentiments in the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina prior to 1992 speak of nationalism on the rise2, although whether 
nationalism was cause or effect, and which of this was true for which groups, is a 
complicated discussion.  
A referendum regarding independence was held in 1992, where 99.7% of those who 
voted, voted for independence3 BiH was recognized shortly thereafter by the EC as an 
independent state (Vollan and Butenschøn 2011:153). A war ensued, largely about territory, 
fuelled by sentiments, personnel and motivation from both inside and outside BiH´s borders.  
It is hard to coin the war in broad terms. Bosniacs tend to see it as a war with clear aggressors 
(SFRY and the Republic of Croatia), whereas Serbs tend to see it as an inter-ethnic civil war 
where all parties participated equally. The Croats are often more ambivalent  (Vollan and 
Butenschøn 2011:169). However, there can be no doubt that nationalism, ethnicity and 
religion were used as political capital, creating fear and leading to a state of “collective 
paranoia” between the three main groups (Woodward 1995:228). The proclamation of a 
Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, 
where territory reserved for one group only was the constituting principle, were nationalist 
projects pushed forwards by Serb and Croat leaders both within and without the republic of 
BiH  (Vollan and Butenschøn 2011:153; Nystuen 2005:37). Serbs had ensured control over 
the Jugoslav National Army (JNA). Thus, they were the strongest military power of the three 
warring factions, and were able to conquer substantial amounts of territory in the beginning 
of the war (Ramet 2006:ch. 14-ch. 15).  
During the war, the educational system quickly fell victim to the war. Already from 
1992, the schools (the ones that were open – many had to close) were divided according to 
military positions and frontlines. This meant that whoever held an area militarily, also 
controlled which curricula were being used in schools, and created a situation where the 
education system was de facto divided in three (Torsti 2009:67). The international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See definition of nationalism, under 1.6 Terms and definitions. 
3 The Serbs largely boycotted the referendum.   
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community tried to broker a peace agreement at several points in the time between 1992 and 
1995, without succeeding. In the time it took before a peace plan to be accepted, more than 
one hundred thousand civilians lost their lives, and millions were displaced. BiH´s economic 
foundations were left in ruins as heavy fighting caused the destruction of massive amounts of 
buildings, roads, factories and infrastructure  (Nystuen 2005:37). More specifically, around 
105 000 people, out of a pre-war population of 4,4 million, lost their lives. 1 370 000 were 
displaced, and 1 200 000 became refugees  (UNDP 1998). The war also brought with it an 
end to a centuries-long diversity (Hronesova 2012:40). 
 
1.6 The Dayton Agreement and its theoretical 
underpinnings 
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (often referred to 
as the Dayton Accords or the Dayton Agreement, but here we shall suffice with the 
abbreviation GFAP) put an end to the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina4. The 
agreement was negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, in November, and came into force when it was 
signed on 15th of December 1995 in Paris  (Vollan and Butenschøn 2011:153-154). Earlier 
proposals and drafts for peace plans had been quite similar to the proposal that were 
presented to the parties in Dayton. The most well known of these are perhaps the Vance 
Owens Peace Plan and the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. These went quite far in condoning 
the new “ethnic landscape” of BiH, in that it distributed territories according to which ethnic 
group was dominant where (Nystuen 2005:52). This landscape was, of course, a consequence 
of the war, as it has been altered by fear and war crimes. When crafting a peace proposal in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, the reality of these alterations had to be dealt with. Earlier 
peace efforts had been condemned, morally, largely because they had condoned the changed 
demographic picture. In 1995 it seemed that accepting the new pattern of ethnic divisions was 
preferable to continued war. Moreover, specific ethnicities were granted certain political 
rights. This was also a compromise that was needed to get the peace agreement signed 
(Nystuen 2005:3-4). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The Washington Agreement that ended the Croat/Muslim war in March 1994 was a step towards peace, ending 
one of the territorial conflicts. It did, however, not include all parties in the conflict, and so fighting continued. 
The Washington Agreement created the Federation between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, one of the 
two entities recognized by the final peace agreement (Nystuen 2005:53).   
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The negotiating parties at Dayton, Ohio were President Alija Izetbegovic as representative of 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, President Franjo Tudjman as representative of the 
Republic of Croatia, and Slobodan Milosevic, as representative of both the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. The Bosnian Serbs were thus represented by 
Milosevic, from Belgrade. These three leaders, as well as a number of representatives for the 
international community, signed the General Framework Agreement (GFA)  (Nystuen 
2005:13, 57). In addition to the GFA, there were 11 Annexes that covered terms and 
conditions. The entire agreement is called the General Framework Agreement for Peace 
(GFAP). Signatories to the Annexes were representatives from groups that were considered 
Bosnian parties to the conflict: The Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian 
Serbs. A joint signature, given by a single representative of the independent state of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina did not seem possible, due to lack of legitimacy of such a person with all 
groups  (Nystuen 2005:13). 
The following are the Annexes of the peace agreements:  
 
1A: Annex on the military implementation of the peace agreement 
1B: Annex on regional stabilisation and disarmament. 
3: Annex on election. 
4. Annex containing Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
5: Annex on arbitration. 
6: Annex on human rights implementation mechanisms. 
7: Annex on refugees and displaced persons. 
8: Annex on a commission to preserve national monuments. 
9: Annex on public corporations. 
10: Annex on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement. 
11: Annex on an international police task force 
(GFAP 1995) 
 
According to the GFAP, BiH should not be a unitary state. It was to consist of two Entities, 
the Federation of BH and Republika Srpska. There would be a common Presidency, 
Parliament, cabinet of ministers and a Constitutional Court. Parliament, in accordance with 
GFAP, contains two houses, the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples  
(Nystuen 2005:67).  
The GFAP was brokered and written in a desperate situation, with time constantly 
running out. There was strong international pressure, and a domestic situation that did not 
allow for much idealism. Gro Nystuen claims that the GFAP did not have a vision, and surely 
not one that tried mimicking any scholarly model. The focus when the agreement was formed 
	  	   18	  
was on stopping the bloodshed. Not much more. Many visions and principles had to be 
sacrificed in order to obtain an agreement, and the result was a framework in violation with 
international human rights – even though the agreement in itself claimed to adhere to existing 
treaties on this realm  (Nystuen 2014; Nystuen 2005). For example, the requirement of ethnic 
affiliation for elections for House of Peoples as well as the Presidency, are clearly 
discriminatory. This has not gone unnoticed, however, as the 2009 verdict from the European 
Court of Human Rights states. The case is known as Sejdic-Finci, and was brought up by two 
individuals who demanded that the state of BiH changed the Constitution to allow all 
individuals in both entities to run for elections in these two government bodies (Vollan and 
Butenschøn 2011:159). As we shall she in the Law-chapter, there have been two chances for 
ending this discrimination through proposed Constitutional changes. Both have failed.  
Back to the GFAP, other reports and books have reiterated or added to the analyses of 
unfortunate features of the design and implementation of the GFAP (Human Rights Centre, 
University of Sarajevo 2012; Bieber 2006; Chandler 2000). However, despite all flaws, the 
peace agreement had to adhere to one particular ideal: Balance of power between the three 
constituent peoples, Croats, Serbs and Bosniacs. To not spell out this balance in great details 
would mean to lose one of the signatories as negotiating partner. The result of negotiations on 
this particular matter was that BiH were to become a federal state, and the new Constitution 
would provide the three groups with guarantees of influence and protection through various 
measures. The central power was – and still is - weak, and there are extensive residual 
powers resting with the entities and even lower levels of governance. 
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The components of the GFAP that make BiH quality as a power-sharing system, is, I would 
argue, a result of the need to ensure the balance of power between the three warring factions. 
First, there is a tripartite, rotating-chair presidency and equal representation of the three 
peoples in the upper chamber of the state parliament (Vollan and Butenschøn 2011:154). This 
is a feature of proportional representation. All elections except those for House of Peoples 
and the Presidency are proportional. There is a possibility for each parliamentary group to use 
what is called entity voting (a double majority) and evoke the vital national interest-clause in 
the GFAP, to stop a law from going through the Parliamentary procedure  (Vollan and 
Butenschøn 2011:154, 165, 166). This is an example of minority veto. The entities have their 
own parliaments, with abilities to pass laws and execute them. All residual powers, meaning 
anything that is not on the list of state responsibilities, are to be handled by the entities 
(Vollan and Butenschøn 2011:162-163).  This is an element of territorial self-governance, or 
autonomy. The only feature that might be missing is the grand coalition. However, grand 
coalition might be understood as rules for decision-making as much as rules for 
representation. As such, the national House of Peoples can, with its de-facto demand for 
consensus, be claimed to be a feature of grand coalition. The presidency, with its demand for 
one representative from each group, can also be deemed to be a feature of grand coalition. All 
references to consociational elements are based on Lijphart  (Lijphart 1969; Lijphart 1977). 
Responsibilities of the central government of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
according to GFAP, Annex 4, art. III, (1): 
• Foreign policy 
• Foreign trade policy 
• Monetary Policy as provided in Article VII 
• Finances of the institutions and for the international obligations of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
• Immigration, refugee and asylum policy and regulation 
• International and inter-Entity criminal law enforcement, including relations with 
Interpol 
• Establishment and operation of common ant international communications facilities 
• Regulation of inter-Entity transportation 
• Air traffic control 
	  	   20	  
A more elaborate discussion about BiH as a case of a power-sharing democracy is found in 
Chapter 2. 
GFAP´s entry into force in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not subject to any domestic 
legal procedure such as a referendum or a parliamentary vote. The international community 
couldn´t take that chance, given the risk that a referendum could stop the entry into force. 
The presence of international community in the brokering of the peace agreement was 
substantial. The US government, as well as the Contact Group for Former Yugoslavia were 
part of the process. The Contact Group consisted of the US, UK, France, Germany, Russia 
and the EU/EC  (Nystuen 2005:12). The GFAP is a wide-ranging legal instrument, involving 
both transitional (for example demilitarization and return of refugees and displaced persons) 
as well as permanent features (for example the constitution and the human rights annex) 
(Nystuen 2005:66). 
 
1.7 The February 2014 unrest 
Jumping cruelly fast ahead, the last element that needs explaining is February 2014. Violent 
protests and riots in Bosnia and Herzegovina started in early February in Tuzla, following the 
closure and sale of factories that had employed most of the local population. The unrest 
quickly spread to around 30 other cities in BiH. Hundreds of people have been reported 
injured in the most violent incidents since the 1992-1995 war. Police have used tear gas, 
rubber bullets and water to disperse protesters  (BBC 2014). 
The crowds mainly targeted government buildings. For example, protesters 
surrounded the Bosnian presidency in Sarajevo. Cantonal governmental buildings in Zenica, 
Bihac, Tuzla and Mostar were torched. Protesters expressed anger over the extensive degree 
of corruption and inefficiency in government of all levels. Unemployment is also a major 
issue. There is a general sentiment in BiH that politicians become obstructive and inefficient 
as soon as they get to power. Demands for resignation from office were voiced in many of 
the affected cities. Not long after the first protests, the whole cantonal government of Tuzla 
and Zenica resigned, as did Mario Sulenta, Interior Minister in Mostar  (Balkan Insight 
2014). The prime minister of Sarajevo canton and the cantonal government of Bihac have 
also resigned (per 25.03.2014). Most of the unrest has taken place in cities of the Federation. 
Some protests did occur in Banja Luka, but these were peaceful and lasted for only one day 
(Pasic 2014). 
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In ethnically divided Bosnia and Herzegovina, these protests have been surprisingly 
all encompassing when it comes to ethnic make-up of the marching masses. None the less, 
correspondents observe how media and public debate is used by elites to try and blame “the 
other”  (Pasic 2014; Sarajlic 2014). For example, Bosniac political elites claim that the 
protests were orchestrated by the Serbs to destabilize the country so the RS can secede, Serb 
and Croat elites claimed that the upheavals were initiated by Bosniacs to destroy the federal 
organization of the country and make it more unitary  (Sarajlic 2014). However, no 
trustworthy sources can be found for claiming that motivation behind the upheavals was in 
any way ethnic. The contention was, in all likeliness, an example of the population rising to 
address issues that are affecting them all. The demographic profile of the protesters was 
diverse. War veterans, pensioners, citizen´s associations, labour movements and youth have 
all participated (Pasic 2014). Former High Representative Wolfgang Petrisch argues that 
public discourse has now abandoned the ethnic-driven “policy of fear” through these protests. 
He is glad to note a movement in favour of the bread-and-butter issues of today  (Petrisch 
2014). 
1.8 Terms and definitions 
I use contentious vocabulary in this thesis, due to the mere fact that the vernacular in this 
field is loaded with such terms. Gary Goertz states: “There is no real difference between 
defining a word and providing an analyses of a concept” (Goertz 2006:3). This seems to be 
saying that how you define a word, tells a great deal of how you perceive not only what you 
are defining, but also the realm around it. Definitions are important and contextual, and I 
shall treat them as such. 
Ethnicity: Ethnicity has become an umbrella concept in scholarly as well as non-scholarly 
vocabularies. It often denotes most any form of group consciousness, from race to language, 
colour and religion. A quite basic definition is that is the fact or state of belonging to a social 
group that has a common national or cultural tradition (Oxford Dictionaries 2010). 
Furthermore, ethnicity can be viewed as a social phenomenon, with a framework of us/them-
thinking  (Calhoun 1994:2). Fredrik Barth sees ethnicity as something fluid, flexible, 
changeable and deeply social. It malleability means that both boundaries around and content 
within the ethnic categories can be renegotiated and (re)produced  (Barth 1969). A final 
contribution accentuates that in contrast to social stratification, which divides or unifies 
people along horizontal axes on the basis of socioeconomic factors, ethnic identities creates 
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division and unification along vertical axes. Thus, ethnic groups should, in theory, draw 
members from all strata of the population. Moreover, ethnic group identity has a strong 
psychological or emotional component that serve to identify and divide (Peoples and Garrick 
2011:389). To sum up, the understanding of ethnicity in this project is influenced by social 
anthropology, and is mainly based on people´s perception of themselves and others. In BiH 
such a definition of ethnicity makes sense, and if using the above as a framework, you would 
find that Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs are clearly demarcated ethnic groups, with us/them-
divides and a consciousness around history and culture that is discernable even in brief 
conversations. Hronesova argues that those who are a result of mixed marriages suffer from 
an ongoing crisis of identity, as they have trouble defining who is the “self” and who is the 
“other”  (Hronesova 2012). This suggests that the realms of the three groups are a social 
reality whether or not you fit into them. The choices made by people of mixed descent with 
regards to spouse, religious practice, place of residence etc. takes on a value-laden 
characteristic, positioning the person vis a vis ethnic reference points shared by most citizens 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Democracy: Since the word democracy will be used repeatedly in this thesis, there is a need 
to establish a basic understanding of the term itself – independent of the theoretical 
framework constructed around it in Chapter 2, as this will be more controversial and less 
basic. Democracy is a form of government in which all eligible citizens participate equally – 
either directly or indirectly through representatives (Oxford Dictionaries 2010). Moreover, it 
is to be regarded as a system of governance characterised by 1) upward control, meaning that 
sovereignty stems from the lowest levels of authority, 2) political equality, and 3) social 
norms fostering an environment where breaks on the first two principles are deemed 
unacceptable (Kimber 1989). Writing about democracy is almost always normative. More 
democracy is considered better. This project is no exception. 
Culture: Ethnic groups are said to have a shared culture. In this project, culture will be 
understood as the ideas, customs and social behaviour of a particular people or society 
(Oxford Dictionaries 2010). 
Nationalism and nation: As these terms are not particularly central, it is not necessary to 
create a major discussion around it. However, as “nationalism” is used more than once, it is 
necessary to provide a definition. Hence, nation must also be defined. 
Starting with the former, a fitting definition of nationalism would be that it is “an ideological 
movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which 
some of its members deem to constitute and actual or potential “nation”” (Smith 2010:9-10). 
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Oxford dictionaries defines “nation” as “a large body of people united by common descent, 
history, culture, or language, inhabiting a particular state or territory” (Oxford Dictionaries 
2010). This definition demands territory. However, in a globalising world, the nation is 
increasingly understood as an entity that is not spatially defined. Benedict Anderson´s defines 
nation as an  “imagined political community” (Anderson 1991:6-7), capturing the subjective 
aspects of nation as a perceived entity. I prefer a combination of the two, seeing nation as a 
large body of people united by common descent, history, culture or language, who also seek 
spatial unity. Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs in BiH fit this definition. It also allows for the 
inclusion of diaspora – not vital in this project, but worth mentioning. 
1.9 List of abbreviations: 
As mentioned, Bosnia and Herzegovina and BiH will be used interchangeably. Moreover, the 
terms indicator and variable are both referring to the concept of independent variable, as 
defined by King, Keohane and Verba  (1994:77).  In addition, power sharing system and 
consociational system are used intermittently, referring to the same school of thought.  
 
The following abbreviations will be in use: 
SFRY – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
RS – Republika Sprska, not to be confused with the state of Serbia. 
FBiH – Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
GFAP  - General Framework Agreement of Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as 
the Dayton Peace Agreement or the Dayton Accords. 
 
 
Abbreviations of Political Parties found in Tables: 
SDA – Party of Democratic Action – Stranka Demokratske Akcije 
SDS  - Serb Democratic Party – Srpska Demokratska Stranka 
SRS – Serbian Radical Party – Srpska Radikalna Stranka 
SDP – Social Democratic Party – Socijaldemokratska Partija Bosne i Herzegovine 
HDZ – Croatian Democratic Union – Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica Bosne i Herzegovine 
SNSD – Alliance of Independent Social Democrats – Savez Neznavisnih Socijaldemokrata 
SBIH – Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina - Stranka za Bosnu i Herzegovinu 
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PDP Mladen Ivanic – Party of Democratic Progress Mladen Ivanic - Partija Demokratskog 
Progresa Mladen Ivanic 
SNS – Biljana Plavsic – Serbian Progressive Party – Srpska Napredna Stranka 
DNS RS – Democratic National Alliance - Demokratski Narodni Savez 
HSS – Croat Peasant Party - Hrvatska Seljacka Stranka 
NHI – New Croat Initiative Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa 
SBB – Union for a Better Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Savez za bolju buducnost BiH 
1.10 Personal point of departure 
I became interested in Bosnia and Herzegovina through studies at the Norwegian Nansen 
Academy in 2006/2007. Since then I have been travelling in, studying and reading about the 
country. I have been especially interested in the topic of divided societies. I don´t speak the 
language, hence I had to rely on translators to obtain some of the data.   
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2 THEORY 
In this chapter, a conceptual framework will be built onto which to superimpose the data. In 
relation to the Research Question, there are two concepts that in particular need to be filled 
with meaningful content. These are democracy and reconciliation – the concepts in the 
dependent variable (see Chapter 3). Below, I will argue that these two terms are visions 
inherent in political systems that have a consociational, or power sharing, design (terms will 
be used interchangeably). First in this chapter, the theory of power sharing will be presented 
to give background on kind of political category that BiH belongs to as a state, along with an 
argument for why BiH is, in fact, a consociational democracy. Then, theoretical contributions 
pertaining to democracy and reconciliation will be presented. These terms are –regardless of 
how their theoretical origins define them- to be considered as continuums, but with no clear 
demarcation scale. There is a normative aspect in play, in that more reconciliation and more 
democracy are considered to be better. 
2.1 Introduction to consociationalism 
In the following I shall present basic ideas within consociationalism, as well as recent 
developments in the tradition. Then, inherent visions about post-conflict situations are 
presented, as well as the practical arrangements through which these visions are to be 
realized. Last in this paragraph comes a brief overview of the criticism posed against the 
tradition. 
The over-arching goal of governmental set-ups – and especially so in a post-conflict 
society – is to create a functioning and stable democracy where law and order prevails. Some, 
such as John Stuart Mill, have claimed that democracy is “next to impossible” in multi-ethnic 
societies – and completely impossible in linguistically divided societies  (Mill 1958 
[1861]:42). It has on the other hand been claimed that democracy is the only system in which 
diversion within the population can be accommodated without subduing or assimilating any 
part of it (Wolff 2012:23). The question of how to design such a democracy becomes a 
pivotal question. Arend Lijphart, by many viewed as the founding father of the consociational 
school of thought, draws out a democratic design allowing a society can be both fragmented 
and stable. His first contributions, originally published in 1969, analysed Netherlands and 
Belgium, alongside with Scandinavian countries (Lijphart 2002 [1969]), but later on he 
moved on to study more severely fragmented societies  (Ljiphart 1977). Many democratic 
constitutions prescribe majoritarian decision making for day-to-day business when the stakes 
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involved are not to high. In times of crises, extraordinary majorities or consecutive majorities 
are common (such as when constitutional amendment is on the agenda). In such a situation, a 
state often resorts to a form of power sharing that ensures broad representation. An example 
is Sweden, which formed grand coalition governments during the Second World War. The 
decisions that need to be made in times of crises are deemed so important that majority rule is 
abandoned, even in consensual and rather homogenous societies. In fragmented societies, 
says Lijphart, a large number of decisions are viewed in this light (Lijphart 2002 [1969]:30-
31). Thus, systems must be designed to alleviate anxieties and hostilities. His – and 
consociational, in the traditional sense – solution consists of a set of tools to remove 
competitive features as much as possible, in order to make the different groups feel confident 
that they are represented in decision-making processes (Lijphart 2002 [1969]:31). A power-
sharing arrangement seeks to include potential “spoilers” and their constituencies in formal 
decision-making procedures, because they need to be convinced that expected payoff for 
peaceful cooperation is greater than payoff for violent behaviour. A consociational set-up 
provides a “floor” for each party´s returns, limiting the uncertainty found in democratic 
societies by limiting the ability of larger social groups to completely quell the influence of 
small groups (Gates and Strøm 2007:3). It follows from this argument that an awful lot is 
expected from elites. Elites need to be committed to maintenance of the system and to 
accommodate divergent interests and demands. This rests on an assumption that elites 
understand the perils of political fragmentation  (Lijphart 2002 [1969]:32). Despite these 
words of caveat against pro accommodation and against fragmentation, it is recommended 
that transactions between antagonistic subcultures in divided societies be kept to a minimum 
(Lijphart 2002 [1969]:35). Such a recommendation has often been taken to imply that “good 
fences make good neighbours”. All in all, consociationalism envisions a society where ethnic 
tensions are lowered over time. The cause-effect mechanism through which this is 
accomplished is by providing channels of influence and representation, seeking to form 
incentives for elites to behave cooperatively. A consequence of a “successful” power sharing 
system in a divided society would, according to a power sharing logic, be that ethnic markers 
and communal lines cease to be the most salient factor of political life over time. It would 
also be that decisions are made peacefully and efficiently, both at central and local level. 
 What practical arrangements should bring about these visions? In his 1969 article (Lijphart 
2002 [1969]), there is a recommendation for the government to be formed according to the 
principle of grand coalition – every group should be represented in the executive power. In 
1977, three other features are added  (Ljiphart 1977). The treatment of more deeply divided 
	  	   27	  
societies seem to necessitate a more complex theory. The way to accomplish democratic and 
inter-communal ideals in such societies, are through a set of tools. In its most basic form, 
these are 1) grand coalition governments that include representatives of all major linguistic 
and religious groups, 2) cultural autonomy for these groups, 3) proportionality in political 
representation and civil service appointments, and 4) a mutual veto with regard to vital 
minority and autonomy (Lijphart 2002 [1996]:42; Ljiphart 1977:ch. 2). To ground these 
features a bit more, each paragraph tying a consociational trait to conditions in BiH (see 
below) will start with relaying this writer´s understanding of the trait. 
One of consociationalism´s most adamants critics, Donald Horowitz, claim, much to 
the contrary of the above visions, that a consociationalistic societal set-up reifies and hardens 
ethnic identities. He also holds that multi-ethnic coalitions generate inter-ethnic competition, 
or flanking. Rival cooperation is inherently unstable, and the focus becomes centred upon 
ethnicity instead of integrating identities such as class  (Horowitz 1985; 1991; 2003). This 
would seem to be in contrast with visions of a lowered importance of communal lines and 
peaceful conditions for decision-making. Lijphart and Horowitz are often purported as eternal 
adversaries in the theory of how to deal with divided societies. Power-sharing scholars have 
met the criticism with efforts to refine and modernise some of the theory. For example, a 
more flexible view of groups is deemed important. In traditional, or “corporate” 
consociationalism (as represented by Lijphart in the 70´s), it is assumed that group identities 
are “fixed, and that groups are both internally homogenous and externally bounded” 
(McGarry 2007:172). In a more recent contribution, McGarry instead embraces a “liberal 
consociationalism”. When put into practice, it “rewards whatever salient political identities 
emerge in democratic elections, whether these are based on ethnic groups, or on sub-group or 
trans-group identities” (McGarry 2007:172). This would mean that shifts in group-identities 
or loyalty patterns within the population would be mirrored in institutions, by way of 
democratic elections. A liberal consociationalism, however, requires considerable foresight in 
the writing of constitutions and other legally binding texts. According to Wolff, a more 
liberal concept of group identities could be a way of addressing the “empirically valid” 
criticism referred to above (Wolff 2012:26). I do not aim for an 
integrationist/consociationalist discussion. The intention is to show a glimpse of 
developments in the tradition that have been spurred by critique from outside of it.  
Summing up, consociationalism can be considered a system of tools and visions that are 
thought to aid the delivery of functional and stable democracy, as well as the gradual 
reduction of communal divisions over time. 
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2.2 Is Bosnia and Herzegovina post 1995 a 
consociational democracy? 
For new data about developments in BiH to be relevant to the discussion of consociational 
democracy, we need to establish that BiH is, in fact, such a democracy. Only then can new 
findings be influential. Since most of the arrangements of the GFAP are still in place in the 
daily governing of Bosnia and Herzegovina, elements of the GFAP is going to be a large part 
of this discussion. 
There is no mention in the Dayton Accords that it considers itself a consociational 
agreement. Neither is the term power sharing used  (GFAP 1995). On the one hand, it might 
be reasonable to demand theoretical underpinnings such as this one to be explicit, if we are to 
treat it as a case of that theoretical school. On the other hand, it can be imagined that 
unvoiced ideas could be underlying a more concrete product without explicit reference. 
Knowing the basics about the very difficult climate in the 1995 peace negotiations, it is 
hardly surprising that attention was on hands-on issues rather than theoretical frameworks. It 
thus seems possible that the GFAP could have been based on consociational thinking without 
stating it. Sumantra Bose is one of those who claim that GFAP has elements of, among other 
things, devolution, federalism and consociationalism (2002:202). The same is Weller (2010). 
This backs up the possibility of regarding the GFAP as a consociational arrangement even 
though it is not explicitly said to be. Below follows a more stringent discussion of central 
elements in the BiH Constitutional set-up, structured according to the four characteristics 
deemed most important in the theoretical model of power sharing. This serves the purpose 
both of elaborating the four characteristics mentioned earlier, as well as discussing whether 
or not they fit Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
a) Grand coalition 
All major linguistic and religious groups should be represented in the executive power, 
according to Lijphart  (Lijphart 2002 [1996]:42). This would entail a definition of what 
constitutes a “major group”, as well as technical procedures that all could agree on.  In a 
consolidated democracy, governments are often formed that are just large enough to control a 
majority of parliamentary seats. But in a grand coalition, most or all parties are part of the 
government, broadening the views of the cabinet to include that of all groups (Ljiphart 1977). 
According to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, governments are not grand 
coalition governments. There are, however, two features of grand coalition spelled out in the 
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Constitution: Each group needs to have one representative in the Presidency, and the decision 




Lijphart purports “cultural autonomy” for the groups recognized in criterion a)  (Lijphart 
2002 [1996]:42). Wolff notes how power-sharing theorists often use autonomy used to speak 
of both a territorially separate unit within an otherwise unitary state, and the right of some 
group or representatives of a cultural group to make decisions independently from the federal 
government. The meaning of autonomy is, apparently, used in both abstract and concrete 
form, although the two are often intertwined. Common for them is the transfer of certain 
powers from a central government to that of the self-governing entity (Wolff 2012:27-28). At 
the most aggregate level, the BiH Constitution states that the country is divided into two 
entities (GFAP 1995:annex IV, art. I (3)). It also states that these are to be separated by an 
Inter Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) (GFAP 1995:annex 2). Such a provision is an example of 
territorial self-governance (TSG). The Cantons in the Federation is also a feature of TSG. 
They have their own governments and ministries. The Cantons are hardly mentioned in the 
Dayton Accords, and have their roots in the peace agreement between Bosniacs and Croats in 
1994. Regardless, the decision to allow FBiH to keep the Cantons, with extensive powers, 
must be regarded as a TSG measurement. Moving on to the abstract level, the entities were 
allowed to keep their constitutions, although the agreement read that these would be amended 
“to ensure conformity” with the BiH Constitution over time  (GFAP 1995:annex 4, art. XII 
(2) and III (3) (b)). Moreover, art. III (3) (a) of the Constitution states that all powers not 
explicitly defined as the central government´s responsibility, should be regarded as entity 
responsibility. This includes education and military forces (the armed forces were, however, 
moved under the control of central governmental, following a law passed by Parliament in 
2004). In reality, this means that Bosnia and Herzegovina has 14 bodies with legislative 
powers. It could be argued that this is not abstract at all, because these powers have 
geography as its basis. However, since Bosnia and Herzegovina is substantially more 
homogenous than before the war (Valenta and Strabac 2013:129), this trait can be said to 
have an ethnic or cultural basis. As such, it is abstract. As an example, 90% of the current 
population in Republika Srpska is surmised to be Serbs, and many studies indicate that 
Bosnian cities, towns and municipalities have become mono-ethnic. Furthermore, it is 
stipulated that the development is irreversible (Valenta and Strabac 2013:129; Ahmetasevic 
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2006). Thus, Bosnia and Herzegovina has autonomy measures, both in a geographical and an 
abstract sense – although the latter is merely implicit.  
 
c) Proportional representation 
Lijphart defines proportional representation as another tool with which to ensure a functional 
and democracy in a divided society  (Lijphart 2002 [1996]:42). Such a trait must necessarily 
also operate on the basis of a negotiated definition of which groups that are to be represented, 
and it seems reasonable to assume that all institutions that in any way can shape decisions in 
the political system should be affected by such a system. The Constitution defines Serbs, 
Croats and Bosniacs as Constituent Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina  (GFAP 1995:annex 
4, preamble), and provides legal foundation for ethnic representation in both chambers of the 
central law making body, the Parliamentary Assembly. Whereas groups are not guaranteed 
what representation they will end up with in the House of Representatives (as it is based on 
entity and not ethnicity), they are guaranteed to have one-third of the representatives in the 
House of Peoples (GFAP 1995:annex 4, art. IV (1) and (2)). Through an imposed law from 
the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in 2002, entity Constitutions were amended to 
harmonize with the BiH Constitution. This entailed that more institutions than before were 
required to be proportional, making BiH a triple-sharing system (Bieber 2006 :44). From this, 
we can conclude that the GFAP have strong features of proportional representation. If 
anything, the insistence of proportionality seems to have gotten stronger over the years. 
 
d) Mutual veto 
Another device in theories about power sharing in divided societies is the possibility of 
groups to stop decisions that would have a negative effect on important group rights as well 
as autonomy (Lijphart 2002 [1996]:42). This, as is often heard as an argument for power 
sharing, will heighten the degree of security that can be obtained by cooperating in a 
democratic set-up  (Ljiphart 1977). A mutual veto should be available for all defined groups 
for it to be reasonable, as well as having well formulated criteria and procedures for its usage. 
Otherwise there is a risk of the tool being used for obstruction and sabotage. The groups 
defined as constitutional people in BiH have such a right to veto decisions. They can do so in 
two ways. First, the Delegates from the House of Peoples can declare a proposed decision 
from the Parliamentary Assembly to be destructive for a vital interest for the Croat, Serb or 
Bosniac people. A majority of the ethnic caucus in the House of Peoples vote needs to 
support the issuance of such a declaration. Members of the BiH Presidency can also evoke 
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the Vital National Interest-rule. Croats and Serbs were adamant during negotiations of the 
GFAP that the ethnic veto should be final, with no deadlock-breaking mechanisms embedded 
in the Agreement. However, a claim for VNI can be nullified by the Constitutional Court, to 
which the case is referred. They have authority to decide whether proper procedure has been 
followed. This does not mean that they can decide on the subject matter – whether a vital 
national interest is really at stake  (Nystuen 2005:75). In practice, however, the Constitutional 
Court has shown that it actually also takes this into account.  The second provision for mutual 
veto is often referred to as Entity Voting. It is a requirement that goes for both chambers, and 
it means that a decisions passes if they get the votes from the majority of those present and 
voting, unless the dissenting votes include two-thirds or more of the delegates elected from 
either entity, or either caucus in the House of Peoples (Nystuen 2005:76) It can thus be 
concluded that mutual veto rules are in place at the central level of BiH, as a result of the 
GFAP. 
 
Concluding, the BiH Constitution as it stands today, has strong elements of consociational 
thinking. Next, I will construct a theoretical frame containing contributions on two concepts 
that are central in ontological world of power-sharing democracies: Democracy and 
reconciliation. 
2.3 Establishing main concepts 
Power-sharing theory presents a set of tools along. Tools are used to create outcomes. I 
would argue that two of these outcomes are democracy and reconciliation. However, what 
kind of democracy and reconciliation is not a given.  
The chosen framework is centred on the citizen. Structural measures form a sort of 
minimum criteria. They are deemed necessary, but not very fruitful when attempting to link 
data to theoretical concepts. The approach chosen is more bottom-up. As indicators in this 
thesis capture features of daily life such as which school to send your child to and the choice 
of whether or not to return to where you lived before the war, such a framework makes more 
sense than a more structural, technical one. Moreover, recent unrest in BiH suggests the 
importance of grounding theory in how population perceives, rather than in technical criteria 
for, democracy and reconciliation. The downside of such a framework is that some pivotal 
elements are vague, in that it leaves to popular perception to define, for example, 
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cooperation, dialogue and “demands and preferences” vis á vis politicians. However, such a 
cost seems outweighed by the benefits of this framework. 
2.3.1 Democracy 
Democracy can be defined as a political system containing 1) universal adult suffrage, 2) 
recurring, free, competitive, and fair elections, 3) more than one serious political party, and 4) 
alternative sources of information (Diamond and Morlino 2005:10-11). These are deemed to 
be structural, minimum criteria. Above, it is argued that consociational thinking envisions 
stable and functional democracies. To better capture citizen´s experience, this is redefined as 
democratic quality. In latter years, voices have emerged that advocate for looking beyond 
terse, structural measures of democracy, onto questions pertaining to more substantive 
qualities than can or cannot be present in a democracy  (Diamond and Morlino 2005). The 
point of this is to have a better way of analysing how a democracy is functioning and being 
perceived by its citizens. This is an idea that makes sense in the project at hand. 
The analytical framework divides democratic traits into three analytical categories 
(procedural dimensions, substantial dimensions and outcomes). Procedural dimensions 
encompass over-arching, structural features of a democracy: The rule of law, participation, 
competition and accountability (both horizontally and vertically). Substantial dimensions 
encompass respect for civil and political freedoms, as well as progressive implementation of 
greater political, social and economic equality. Outcomes serve as a link between procedural 
and substantive dimensions by measuring the extent to which public policies correspond to 
citizen’s demands and preferences. The main point if these scholars is that you can´t claim 
that the quality of democracy is good unless substantial dimensions, measured by outcomes, 
are fulfilled. The outcomes are to be judged by those who democracy serve, namely the 
people (Diamond and Morlino 2005). In sum, democratic tools and features alone doesn´t 
provide the realisations of democratic ideals. It is the content side of it that matters. In this 
project, the above constitute the framework for assessing democratic quality.  
Gates and Strøm´s article on transaction costs and agency loss completes the 
framework of democracy. Their universe is that of power sharing democracies, and the 
potential of power sharing is discussed in relation to peace making and democratic ideals. 
Fruitful for this endeavour is the highlighting of some problematic aspects that pertain to 
democratic quality. Gates and Strøm hold that a high degree of sensitivity of political 
outcomes (election results) to the performance of relevant players (procedural performance 
sensitivity) is good, as in more democratic. Second, they hold that a large share of ex ante 
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uncertainty about feasible political outcomes is good, as in more democratic, because it 
promotes competition and makes sure the one with the most public support gets the most 
votes (Gates and Strøm 2007:5). However, there is also a prerequisite that the result should 
be considered fair ex post for a system to be viewed as democratic. No group should receive a 
payoff that falls below a certain level of acceptability. In divided societies, this is more 
important than in perhaps any other system. This is where consociationalism has its great 
strength – it is very fair ex post. However, this comes at the expense of uncertainty and 
procedural performance sensitivity, the authors hold. In other words, in a power-sharing 
system, some features of democracy are being promoted at the expense of others (Gates and 
Strøm 2007:5-7). As such, “while power- sharing may help prevent conflict, at least some 
power-sharing arrangements may at the same time be detrimental to democratic 
accountability and favour politicians that represent narrow group constituencies” (Gates and 
Strøm 2007:7). This may lead to group-oriented and rent-seeking behaviour, at the expense of 
public good provision. Institutional design in power-sharing democracies are often 
complicated, making it hard for citizens to reveal and police acts that go against the common 
interest of the people. Many decisions are made behind closed doors, and elites may form 
cartels based on mutual interests  (Gates and Strøm 2007:7). “Elite cartels” is an 
acknowledged trait of consociational systems (Ljiphart 1977:216). Gates and Strøm point to 
the hazards of them. The maze of trade-offs and ideals outlined above are captured by the 
terms transaction costs and agency loss. I understand these as diagnostic concepts, pointing 
to (unfortunate) outcomes that are especially prevalent in power sharing democracies. It is 
these terms that will be important as backdrop for my analysis. Transaction costs refer to a 
lack of decision-making in the institutions that are assigned with decision-making powers. 
Agency loss occurs between politicians (agents) and people (the principals), and refers to the 
difference between what principals want and what agents deliver5. The latter, Gates and 
Strøm claim, shows the cost of including potential “spoilers” (of a peace process) in political 
life. On the pro-side, these are clear representatives of their groups. They are easy to identify, 
and are seen as secure providers of private goods by the principals in the short run. In the 
long run, however, these agents are less likely to work for the common good (Gates and 
Strøm 2007:8). Summing up. The more transaction costs and agency loss are present in a 
society, and the less substance (in the form of concrete outcomes, as deemed by the citizen), 
the poorer the quality of democracy. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 As such, it overlaps somewhat to the demand for substance, in the writings of Diamond and Morlino.  
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2.3.2 Reconciliation 
In addition to a framework for assessing democratic quality, there is also a need for a 
conceptual framework pertaining to reconciliation. The level of animosity between groups in 
the Republic of BiH was low during its time as a Yugoslav republic, although perceptions 
about cultural differences were present  (Hronesova 2012:37). The return to such a state – 
awareness of difference, but without animosity – constitutes the most fundamental meaning 
of the term reconciliation in this thesis. However, for a more elaborate framework, I will 
draw upon Johan Galtung´s term “positive peace” (Galtung 2012). Galtung constructs an 
intricate theory of violence and peace, with three forms of “peacelessness” (Direct Violence, 
Structural Violence and Cultural Violence) and three forms of peace (Direct Peace, Structural 
Peace and Cultural Peace) (Galtung 2012:12). An important insight to be gained from reading 
his work is that absence of violence is not the same as peace – at least not if we understand 
peace as harmonious coexistence where people can live free of exploitation, animosities and 
suppression. Galtung´s presentation of incremental levels goes in the direction from war 
towards peace, and describes numerous stages along the way. This creates a much more 
nuanced conceptual framework than the dichotomy of “war” and “peace”. The character of 
intergroup communication and interaction are vital when identifying different stages. At one 
extreme end we find warfare as direct violence. At the other, we find “positive nonviolence”, 
meaning cooperation, dialogue, empathy and reconciliation (Galtung 2012:48-49). The gain 
in including Galtung´s work is to be able to posit developments (i.e. data scores) on a 
continuum from coexistence without violence, but with conflict, to coexistence with harmony 
and low levels of conflict. The term reconciliation in this project will be shorthand for 
positive nonviolence. Why not use “positive nonviolence” in full? One reason is that 
reconciliation is an established concept for many people in BiH, as it has been part of the 
post-war discourse for 18 years. Another is that it seems to be a good term for the inter-
communal development that is a vision in consociational theory. A third reason is that the 
prefix “re” suggests a temporal dimension, suiting the longitudinal design of this project. 
Finally, and most importantly, I wish to suggest that dialogue, empathy and cooperation are 
in fact necessary ingredients in reconciliation. As such, reconciliation is posited one level 
above the other three terms, conceptually.  
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Summing up, we now seem to have established a framework of theory that enables us to posit 
data in relation to the two most important concepts of the research question: Democratic 
quality and reconciliation. 
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3 METHOD 
I have collected data on four variables to answer my research question. Whereas I have 
previously defined the “what” of this thesis, it is now time to turn to the question of “how”. 
How will I reach conclusions? In what follows, I will review methodological concepts, and 
posit the thesis in relation to these. 
 
Methodological outline 
3.1 The thesis in relation to central methodological 
concepts 
I have conducted a case study with one single case. This seems to be the only viable way of 
answering the research question posed. A puzzle such as this calls for many observations on 
chosen indicators to obtain validity; that we “measure what we think we are measuring” 
(King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:25) and reliability, which refers to the degree to which the 
findings of a study are independent of accidental circumstances of their production (Miller 
and Kirk 1986:20). A common imperative in social science research is to increase the number 
of cases to increase validity (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). This imperative is not adhered 
to here. Focusing on one case increases the chances of obtaining a high degree of internal 
validity (Gerring 2007:43), in that we get the chance to collect numerous observations. 
Moreover, the Research Question posed demands a high degree conceptual validity (George 
and Bennett 2005:19), and with the introduction of other cases for comparison, this could not 
have been obtained. I would argue that the project at hand has a high degree of conceptual 
validity, in that in-depth knowledge about Bosnia and Herzegovina has been employed to 
arrive at the best indicators for answering the research question. Conceptual and internal 
validity is, as I see it, two sides to the same story. They both emphasize a) the deployment of 
a deep knowledge of the empirical realities of the case, and b) the possibility to collect more 
observations without exceeding time and spatial limits. 
The chosen research design have allowed for many observations, making it more 
likely that we end up with a large number of observable implications (King, Keohane, and 
Verba 1994:29). Gerring strongly encourages the latter in his work about case studies in 
social science (2007:20-22, 26). Observable implications allow a researcher to posit 
aggregate scores correctly. This enhances the possibility of conclusions being correct.  
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Three out of four variables in this project are measured longitudinally, in order to capture 
developments since the peace in 1995. This has been done with regards to x1 (minority 
returns) x2 (elections) and x3 (laws) since a reasonable amount of data has been available for 
all years that are relevant to measure. For variable x4 (schools), measuring individual years is 
not possible due to lack of data. Interviews and academic contributions will constitute the 
basis for an assessment of this variable. The data found on all variables will be compared to 
the established theoretical framework. The caveat of a project like this is that it is too 
ambitious and wide. Thus, inferences must be strictly limited to the areas where 
measurements have been made. It is thus not my intention to “diagnose” Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as a whole. 
Observations will not land in a binary universe where they either support or falsify a 
hypothesis, like observations in a study design inspired by the Deductive-Nomological model 
(Woodward 2009). Rather, they will serve the role as observable implications in relation to a 
conceptual framework. In a thesis where theory plays such an important part, “theoretical 
transparency” - making explicit the theoretical stance from which the interpretation takes 
place – is important. This is because “the theoretical frame produces particular interpretations 
and excludes others” (Moisander and Valtonen 2006:27). The way I have adhered to this 
ideal is through making sure references to the theoretical framework are explicit in the text 
rather than implicit, wherever this makes sense.  
3.2 A case of something else? 
Gerring holds that a case study should aim to “shed light on a larger class of cases (a 
population)” (Gerring 2007:20). Levy has a similar view; a case has come to be regarded as 
an instance of something else (Levy 2008:2). Is the work at hand in contradiction with these 
ideals, as it is analysing data only from BiH? This project can be view as an instance of 
“something else” in several respects. First, it is a demonstration of one way – a citizen 
centred way- to study a post-conflict democracy. Second, elements of it, like the analysis of 
post-conflict voting behaviour, could be transferrable to other deeply divided societies, 
suggesting a way to connect theory and data in such societies. The main focus of this work is 
to measure an empirical situation in the light of theory, to arrive at conclusions about 
democracy and reconciliation. As such, it is a part of a wider literature where on-the-ground 
realities are compared with theoretical models. However, as the above should suggest, the 
aims have been for high internal validity and a deep, rather than wide, investigational focus. 
	  	   38	  
3.3 Fieldwork 
Over the course of this research, I travelled three times to Bosnia and Herzegovina. One was 
an inspirational trip in June 2013, one was in November 2013, and the third time happened in 
January 2014. During the stays I met with selected people and interviewed them, as well as 
visiting official bodies for data collection. My reason for travelling to BiH, when so much of 
the material actually could, at least in theory, be obtained by email or by phone is twofold. 
Firstly, I wanted to include in-depth interviews in my research. It became increasingly clear 
that when studying BiH, you have to go there. Everything from language barriers to the mere 
fact that complex questions are hard to answer via email made it necessary for all interviews 
to be conducted while I was actually in the country. Also, as political scientist and 
anthropological scholar James C. Scott stated in an interview: “You can`t explain human 
behaviour behind the backs of the people who are being explained.” (Glenn 2009:14). This 
quote is appealing because it hints at a process of reality checking data. You have data 
pointing a given way, yet there is what I perceive to be a real need to not “explain things 
behind their backs”. 
During fieldworks, every bit of knowledge and resource I had was put to good use. 
My supervisor has worked and lived several years in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and his 
knowledge was invaluable. He was able to provide me with useful contacts without which my 
attempts at conducting a fieldwork might have been rather pathetic. Also, he has written a 
book about electoral systems in conflict-ridden societies, including Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Vollan and Butenschøn 2011). Secondly, I have worked as a journalist for many years and 
feel comfortable doing interviews. Thirdly, I have gained knowledge about history and 
politics in BiH after having been interested in the country for a long time. These three factors 
put together were vital when I was doing fieldwork. 
3.4 Interviews as method 
During the duration of the work, I conducted more than ten interviews in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. I mapped beforehand which people I wanted to talk to, and wrote a list of 
questions according to their area of expertise. Open-ended questions were used as much as 
possible, to allow for the probing for information as well as flexibility for the respondents to 
structure their responses (Aberbach and Rockman 2002:673). I also took to the habit of 
asking all respondents their general impressions on the issues of x1 (minority returns) and x4 
(schools), as this seemed to be an issue area where it was possible to make an educated guess 
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without having real expertise in the field. Even though I don´t quote everyone that gave their 
opinion on x1 and x4, I used it as a way of making sure the people I had selected were not 
completely out of tune with common perceptions of the field. As it turned out, they were very 
much in tune, reassuring me that I had found knowledgeable people to interview. I am aware 
of the caveat to interpret information relayed in interviews wrong because I have a 
preconceived idea about what they will yield, or because the person I am talking to is similar 
to myself in beliefs and attitudes (Berry 2002). Moreover, there is a general tendency to 
blame the international community for problems in BiH, in addition to exaggerate the sad 
state of affairs. These potential problems were attempted solved by a) increasing the number 
of sources, and b) double-checking statements with questions such as “So, you don´t think 
that all the fuss about segregated schools is an exaggeration, then?” and “Could it be that 
minority returns have happened without it being registered anywhere? Why not?” The point 
was to make sure I had not misheard or misunderstood initial statements. I made notes while 
interviewing in a form of shorthand. I chose not to transcribe interviews from audio 
recordings as I have sufficient experience in my work as a journalist of writing and 
interviewing at the same time. A significant obstacle in relation to interview was my lack of 
knowledge of local language. However, most of the subjects spoke English well. Language 
barriers were only an issue with regards to three interviews. These were with the President of 
the Helsinki Committee in BiH, Srdjan Dzdarevic, former mayor of Tuzla, Selim Beslagic, as 
well as the closest advisor to the mayor of Srebrenica, Amir Kulaglic. Regarding the former, 
I had someone else with me at the interview. We helped each other during the interview, and 
wrote separate transcripts. Last, we consolidated our transcripts through mutual discussion. 
Regarding the two latter, I used an interpreter. 
The role of information obtained from interviews has varied from non-existent (as in 
the election variable) to very important (as in the variable about Schools and Minority 
returns). In relation to Schools, interviews have been the most important source for reaching 
conclusions, as no data allowing for aggregate analysis exists. This is a potential 
methodological problem. I have attempted to solve it by increasing the number of sources, as 
well as interviewing people that I would surmise to have differing opinions. The answers 
have been surprisingly consistent, however, both among representatives from the 
international community, from the political elite and NGO´s. 
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Variables 
In this section dependent and independent variables are presented and justified.  
3.5 Dependent variable 
A dependent variable is an outcome, a puzzle, something we are interested in knowing more 
about, or about the causes behind (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:77). Perceived causes are 
measured by independent variables (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:21). The scores on these 
should yield insights about the dependent variable. How do you decide on a puzzle or an 
outcome to study? To be worthy of scientific endeavour, a research project should set out to 
explain or find out something that is important in the real world, as well as “increase our 
collective ability to construct verified scientific explanations of some aspect of the world” 
(King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:15).  I would argue that my research question matches these 
criteria. The dependent variable in this project, which is 
y1 – democratic quality and degree of reconciliation in BiH 
has been addressed in in academic literature before. However, new data will always “make a 
specific contribution to an identifiable scholarly literature” (King, Keohane, and Verba 
1994:15), even if a dependent variable has been a topic for earlier research. The dependent 
variable here cannot be characterised as “unexplained outcomes” (King, Keohane, and Verba 
1994:77), like in the ideal type of some methods literature. It is rather a premonition or a 
commonly held belief in many circles, albeit more in the line of “what is wrong with Bosnia 
and Herzegovina?” than a clear and defined outcome. The research question and the 
dependent variable came to out of a need to formulate this puzzle in a stringent and scientific 
manner. Current events will be discussed in light of findings on y1. It is supposed that it has 
connection to y1, possibly causal. However, it will be presented as auxiliary evidence for 
conclusions more than a finding in itself.  
 
3.6 Independent variables 
An independent variable, or indicator, can be defined as an explanatory or causal factor, with 
connection to the outcome (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:21). In this context, independent 
variables will be used to arrive at an assessment of democratic shortcomings and degree of 
reconciliation. It is vital that the way variables are operationalized measure the dependent 
variable, and not something else. I have used Gary Goertz´ as a source of reference for 
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critically evaluating whether the indicator/data level is connected with the “basic level” 
(Goertz 2006:6). For simplicity, I formalise the indicators as x1, x2, x3 and x4. 
3.6.1 Choosing independent variables 
Reiterating what is stated above: A case study done right allows for high levels of conceptual 
validity (George and Bennett 2005:19), due to idiographic knowledge invested in the process. 
Moreover, the principle of omitted variable bias has been useful (King, Keohane, and Verba 
1994:168). Omitting the four variables I have chosen would, in my view, increase the chance 
of invalid conclusions to the Research Question. Moreover, it seemed to be the most 
ambitious number of variables possible to incorporate, given the time limitations. 
For maximizing the chance that we are “measuring what we think we are measuring”, or in 
other words obtaining validity (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:25), potential sources of bias 
will be accounted for in the respective chapters. In terms of replicability (King, Keohane, and 
Verba 1994:25-26; George and Bennett 2005:106), I would a) argue that another researcher 
looking for data on the four indicators would probably come to much of the same conclusions 
if seen in the light of the theoretical framework at hand, and that b) sufficient explanation of 
how the data have been collected and analysed will be provided, so as to ensure 
methodological transparency (Moisander and Valtonen 2006:27). When this is said, 
conclusions are inevitably based on reasoning. Reasoning always has an element of 
subjectivity, although this is not the same as to say that all knowledge about social 
phenomena is subjective and worthless, as some claim (Hayek 1980). However, this element 
creates the possibility that another researcher would not end up at similar conclusions. This 
is, in itself, a source of bias, but not one that can be ameliorated other than by providing 
transparency on the issue. Below is a short contextualisation of each independent variable.  
3.6.2 Minority returns – x1 
At the end of the war in 1995 about 1 350 000 were refugees and 1 282 000 were displaced 
persons within BiH. The pre-war population of BiH was 4 364 575 (Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe 1996:45-46, 52). People fled because they were forced, or 
because they were afraid of being targets of violence. The issue of getting people to return to 
pre-war property was complicated by the fact that many buildings were destroyed. Moreover, 
x1 – minority returns 
x2  - elections 
x3 – laws 
x4 -  schools 
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there was a situation of deep mistrust, fear and hatred between the ethnic groups (Hastings 
2001:221-222). Despite of this, getting refugees and internally displaced people (IDP´s) to 
return became a top priority for the international community around 1999-2000, and through 
laws – imposed and passed in Parliament – and vigorous efforts, people got the right to move 
back into their pre-war residence. This seemed a success at first, but it quickly turned out that 
those who were returning were so called “majority returns” – people returning to a place of 
residence where “their” ethnic group was the majority. Minority returns – people returning to 
a place of residence where “their” ethnic group was a minority - proved much harder  
(Hastings 2001). The latest Property Law Implementation Plan statistics show a success rate 
of more than 93% (UNCHR, OSCE, OHR 2006:4), nation wide. There are local variations to 
this number, but they are minor. Every case that is counted within these 93% is one where a 
complaint has been filed, the case has been investigated, a decision made and the case closed. 
The vast majority of decisions were in favour of the claimant. However, I grew to learn that 
there is no data on whether or not people actually moved into the apartments or houses that 
they had won access to. This puzzle seemed important to solve. If BiH of 2014 is, in reality, 
ethnically homogenous, where groups live in pockets, this is important when assessing 
democratic quality. It has potential links to the theory because it affects people´s ability to 
access alternative sources of information. Diamond and Morlino underline this as a criterion 
of democratic quality (Diamond and Morlino 2005:11). It can be argued that everyday 
encounters provide input that nuances, pertaining, in particular, to how to interpret history 
and current day events. This can, just as much as diversity of newspapers or literacy rate be 
defined as access to alternative sources of information. The most important link between this 
indicator and the theoretical framework, however, relates to reconciliation (Galtung 2012:ch. 
5).  
In relation to Goertz´ theories about connection between basic and indicator level 
(Goertz 2006:6), I used four sources to provide the scores that were needed. These were  
a) election results, looking at voting for parties with ethnic affiliation, broken down in so 
called “inside” and “outside” voting6. The assumption is that the increase or decrease of votes 
for Serb/Croat/Bosniac-affiliated parties in areas where these groups are surmised to be in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 “Outside” votes is a term used for when the voter cast his/her vote in the municipality they were registered in 
for the 1991 census, but in which they are no longer living. This can be done from somewhere inside BiH, or 
from abroad, via mail. The right to do so is stated in the BiH Constitution (GFAP 1995:annex. 4). “Inside” votes 
is a term used for when the voter casts his/her votes the regular way, in the municipality in which they are 
currently registered to live in.   
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minority, could tell us something about the development in number of minority returns, b) the 
same election results, but now looking at development of how many votes that are cast from 
outside the municipality – meaning from IDP´s or refugees, in accordance with people´s right 
to do so (GFAP 1995:annex 3, art. IV), compared to votes cast regularly, from inside the 
municipality. This is not intended to measure how many has returned – this is the job of 
source a). What it measures is, I would argue, attitudes of those who have not returned. A 
more elaborate discussion of this can be found in the chapter itself. The findings from 
election results have been paired with c) data from interviews and d) reports and articles 
written by knowledgeable scholars and issue experts. I consider the measurement validity to 
be medium to high on this variable. The data material that I have arrived at through election 
results and interviews should be sufficient. Moreover, claiming that mono ethnic 
communities would affect access to information, constituting a problem for democratic 
quality, also seems defendable. However, the conceptual link between degree of minority 
returns and reconciliation can be criticised as many other factors besides reconciliation could 
affect a decision on whether to become a minority return or not. Here we are moving beyond 
the aggregate mode of analysis above, to the realm of human agency. However, that degree 
of reconciliation constitutes one of the factors that affect the decision of whether or not to 
become a minority return seems undebateable. Moreover, many of these other factors, for 
example opportunities for your child to go to school, or the availability of jobs, is tied in with 
who is ethnic minority and majority at the place in question. Implicitly, then, it is tied in with 
reconciliation. Thus, including degree of minority returns as a measurement of reconciliation 
seems defendable.   
3.6.3 Elections – x2 
The second variable is elections, or, more specifically, development in voter behaviour.  
Elections are an important way that political principals (voters) can inform political agents 
(politicians) about their preferences (Strøm and Gates 2007:12). An over arching goal of 
consociationalism is that ethnic division lines slowly get less and less important, when 
factions and group are guaranteed influence and participation (Lijphart 2002 [1969]; Ljiphart 
1977). If this were true in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we would imagine voter behaviour to 
become less and less nationalistic through the years. As such, a finding for reconciliation can 
be noted. Moreover, such a finding would suggest a political system in which all-
encompassing issues like national economy, pollution, public health and anti-corruption 
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could be addressed, creating outcomes of substance, not just of communal interest. In other 
words: The findings on this variable pertain to both concepts of y1.  
The results on this variable have come from analysing results from all elections since 
1995. For general elections, the numbers registered are for the national House of 
Representatives where such data exist, and entity level Parliament where only these results 
are available. This is the case in 1998. For municipal elections, the numbers registered are for 
municipal councils. These choices have been made to measure the support for nationalistic 
parties on the highest level possible in each election. This, it can be argued, increases the 
chance that the voter is voting for ideology and political programs rather than preferred 
personalities. In municipal elections, this equals municipal councils. In general elections, this 
equals House of Representatives BiH. Mayor elections have not been included; neither have 
elections for the City Council of Mostar. As more than 300 political parties and coalitions 
have run for elections in the 18 years that have passed since 1995, there was a need for 
making a selection. The inclusion criteria was getting 50 000 votes or more in at least one 
election since 1996. For Croat parties, this demand is relaxed to 10 000 parties, alone or in a 
coalition in which a Croat party was dominant. The reason is that the Croats make up a 
relatively small part of the BiH population. Coalitions with less than 2000 votes have not 
been considered in any part of the analysis. A numbers check have been done, ensuring that 
the votes for the parties included in the analysis comprise 80% or more of the national total 
vote for each election.  
Whenever separate data for Brcko have been provided from the Central Election 
Commission, these numbers have not been included in the analysis, as Brcko is, technically, 
part of both entities. When separate data for Brcko have not been provided, I have assumed 
that the CEC have embedded these votes in the results without explicitly stating so.  
For any conclusions about voter behaviour to be meaningful, the degree of nationalism of 
each selected party must be assessed. To do this, I asked for the help of people who are 
knowledgeable in the political landscape in the country, but that are situated outside of the 
game of party politics. Nationalism is, in relation to this indicator, was operationalized as 
more or less focus on communal issues at the expense of devotion to more over-arching 
issues that affect all citizens. Each party has been given a score from 0 to 10, where 0 is no 
communal focus, and 10 is very nationalistic. Based on the scores given, I have made a 
selection of the group of parties that I deem “hardliners”.  
Regarding actually getting election results, this was quite an endeavour. The Central 
Election Commission (CEC) in Sarajevo worked very hard to provide me with the material 
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that I needed. Unfortunately, the data is mostly meant for internal use, and so the format of 
results was highly diverse. Basing analysis on them would be impossible without first 
standardising their format. Each election was presented in a different way, usually needing a 
reading guide to be deciphered. My supervisor and I, with guiding from the CEC, ended up 
doing it the hard way, deciphering codes and manually entering all numbers from all 
elections since 1995. This ended up taking us six months (!!) The work was completed only 
weeks before deadline. I consider measurement validity to be high on this indicator. The 
numbers are manually and carefully worked through, and the link between voter behaviour 
and number of votes received by each party is obvious enough.  
3.6.4 Laws – x3 
Drawing from Chapter 2, outcomes, and thus substance, is a way of assessing democratic 
function (Diamond and Morlino 2005). Moreover, the inability to make decisions 
(“transaction costs”) is one of the most fundamental problems in consociational democracies 
(Strøm and Gates 2007:8). The third indicator addresses decision-making abilities of the 
central government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as an operationalization of the framework 
above. A distinction is made between “new laws” and “changes and amendment-laws”. 
Applying this distinction in the contexts of BiH, they make visible a curious trend that was 
brought to my attention early on in the project. Local sources claimed that the Parliamentary 
Assembly passes nothing substantial in the ways of laws; they keep revising and making 
minor adjustment to already existing legal texts. As such, it is arguable whether they 
represent decisions at all. The results are presented a table, showing longitudinal 
development in passing of the two types of laws, as well as the use of veto mechanisms such 
as Entity Voting and Vital National Interest to obstruct proposed legal texts. I consider 
measurement validity to be high with regards to this variable. The data have been obtained, 
translated and processed by the same source throughout the process, decreasing the chance 
for different sources operating with different definitions. E. Druzic has followed the work of 
BiH central government from 1995, holding various positions along the way, and so should 
be considered trustworthy when it comes to coding of results. Moreover, the conceptual link 
between ability of a democratic system to produce outcomes and the ability of the BiH 
government to pass new laws seem reasonable. 
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3.6.5 Schools – x4 
The fourth and final variable is schools, or more specifically, degree of segregation in 
schools. At Dayton, the area of education was not regulated by the DPA, except for being 
mentioned in Annex 6. Thus, it has been up to the entities to sort the issue of education as 
they see best.  
This variable is not studied longitudinally, although several of the included 
contributions address developments in the past. An introduction to the school system in BiH 
has been given, partly in the history of groups and party in the paragraph about war in BiH. 
Academic sources on the field mainly address segregation pertaining to different curricula 
being taught to different groups (Torsti 2009; Perry 2013; Perry 2003). As an 
operationalization of the theoretical concepts of this project, I was not satisfied with this 
approach, which I see as narrow. The issue of physical separation (separate classrooms, 
entrances and even going to school in shifts) is, I would claim, as important or even more 
important than school children being taught according to different textbooks.  
I have focused on primary education, that is, age 6-15. This is because at this age, the 
kids are still under the rule of their parents, most (if not all) of who have lived through the 
1992-1995 war. As such, the degree of separation in schools is proposed as an 
operationalization of the theoretical concept of reconciliation (Galtung 2012:ch. 5). 
To some degree, I would also argue that degree of separation in classrooms could allow us to 
assess the degree of democratic quality, as lack of access to information (Diamond and 
Morlino 2005:11). For such a conclusion to hold water, “information” must be interpreted 
quite symbolically. In such a mind-set, information could be kids exposed to more than one 
narrative about a certain historical event, or to hear different interpretation of current day 
events. Information could be experiences with “the other side” that shows the heterogeneity 
of opinions inside this group – contrary to the stereotypes that are allowed to remain intact 
with lack of interaction. The assumption underlying this type of argument is that good 
information is nuanced information. I would argue that such a mind-set in relation to 
information is useful. Thus, in a country with high degree of segregation in schools, this 
could pose a problem for the quality of democracy.  
Mainly, though, data on this variable would seem to shed light on degree of 
reconciliation. We remember that “positive nonviolence” requires is cooperation, empathy 
and dialogue between groups (Galtung 2012:ch. 5). As such, degree of segregation, 
especially the physical kind of segregation, seems a useful and defendable operationalization.  
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Methodologically, data collection on the area of physical segregation is made difficult by the 
fact that segregation has largely been ad hoc, local solutions, and as such, there are no 
aggregate data to be obtained. This, in itself, is noteworthy. Numbers, facts and maps are 
very important in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Jansen, 2005), and it doesn´t seem like too far a 
stretch to claim that development and distilment of data about schools has not been 
prioritized by national authorities. The international community also seem to have given up 
on producing such an overview. An ethnography about young peoples living conditions in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  (Hronesova 2012) provides the only academic source I could find 
for the physical aspect of segregation. Its main topic is the lack of contact between the 
younger generations of the three groups. It should be stated that the inferences on this 
variable are the most uncertain in this thesis, due to lack of data. The immediate solution to 
such a problem is to leave the variable out. But when you know that children are taught 
separately almost everywhere that the local community consists of more than one ethnic 
group, this seems a most important variable, as it is well suited to discuss degree of 
reconciliation, and also, to some degree, democratic quality.  
 
3.6.6 Endogeneity 
A final note regarding endogeneity is at hand. Endogeneity is here used in the meaning of a 
causal loop which confuses the direction of causal relations, when the independent variables 
are caused, at least in part, by the dependent variable (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:107). 
I do not see that this poses a large issue in this project, as the dependent variable consist of 
theoretically constructed concepts. When registering data on x1-x4 to arrive at conclusions 
for democratic quality and reconciliation, we have, in essence, constructed one end of the 
equation. A construction is not inclined to cause anything. Thus, it does not seem likely that 
y1 causes x1-x4. However, it could be that more structural phenomena pertaining to y1, such 
as constitutional measures, nationalist sentiments among religious protagonists, unindicted 
war criminals etc., are having an influence on the developments in x1-x4. To draw but one 
example: If a rumoured war criminal (say, a Croat) continues to hold his/her position as a 
teacher, this would surely affect the choices of families of whether or not to let their Bosniac 
children participate in pupil integration programs at the local school. To draw another: if 
Muslim clergy in an area where there is a Bosniac majority openly endorses a nationalist 
us/them-rhetoric, drawing on medieval myths and age-old enemy images, this could have a 
causal effect on whether or not Serbs or Croats choose to return to that image. Both these 
	  	   48	  
examples contain an apparent causal factor that is related to the theoretical concepts of 
reconciliation, the former also to democratic quality. Could endogeneity be an issue, then, as 
x1-x4 might be affected by factors that are similar to y1? In this project, there is a need to 
separate resembling factors and factors actually defined as topic of research. Several factors 
could explain developments in x1-x4, and undoubtedly many of these could be related to 
theoretical concepts in y1. However, the project at hand is not to explain, causally, these 
developments. Rather, it is to uncover facts, and place them in a meaningful analytical 
framework. In such a structure, endogeneity is not a major issue. 
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4 MINORITY RETURNS – X1 
With reference to the theoretical framework posed, minority returns have been chosen as an 
independent variable to measure. 
4.1 Distinctions 
To start off, some distinctions must be made. First, there is a difference between the right to 
return and the act of returning. The right to return might be stated as law (such as the GFAP), 
and come with incentives (such as a document saying you get your house back, from which 
you were driven during the war). Still, a person or a family unit needs to actually do it. We 
cannot surmise that if the right to and the incentives for return existed, the person can be 
counted as having returned. Moving on to a conceptual distinction: “Returns” refers to the 
general phenomena of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP´s from now on) 
coming back to live where they lived before the war. “Return of displaced persons” is 
ethnically neutral, and a subcategory of returns. “Minority returns” is a subcategory of 
returns, and refers to a return of a refugee or IDP in which the person or family coming back 
to live where they lived before the war, constitute an ethnic minority in that place. “Majority 
returns” is a subcategory of returns, and refers to a return in which the person or family 
coming back to live where they lived before the war, is part of an ethnic majority in that 
place. “Real” returns refer to the returns that are not just assumed to have returned since they 
got papers and rights to do so, but who are actually situated in the house (or at least the 
vicinity of the house) that they were driven from during the war. As mentioned above, 
“outside” votes is a term used for when the voter cast his/her vote in the municipality they 
were registered in for the 1991 census, but in which they are no longer living. Such votes 
could be cast from somewhere inside BiH, or from abroad, via mail. The right to do so is 
stated in the BiH Constitution (GFAP 1995:annex. 4). “Inside” votes is a term used for when 
the voter casts his/her votes the regular way, in the municipality in which they are currently 
registered to live in.   
4.2 Sources 
For obtaining data on this variable, I have relied on two sources: a) Interviews regarding the 
number of “real” minority returns, and b) official election data on “inside” and “outside”- 
voting, presented in seven tables. Specifics regarding the measurements will make most sense 
when posited next to the tables, so I have chosen to do this. The goal is to assess how many 
	  	   50	  
of those who obtained rights to property in a place that they were driven from, and who 
would be minority if they went back, actually chose to go back to live here. In other words, 
the goal is to measure the degree of “real” returns. This will be used to assess the degree of 
reconciliation, as well as, to some extent, democratic quality. For justification of the link 
between data and theory: see Chapter 3.   
4.3 Backdrop 
Before the 1992-1995 war, the demographic pattern of BiH was mixed, with the majority of 
the population living in heterogeneous communities (Census 1991). This changed during the 
war. According to a UNCHR estimate, in 1995 only 5 per cent of Croats and Muslims 
remained in Serb-­‐controlled areas. Similarly, only a small percentage of ethnic Serbs had 
stayed in the Federation. A specific number is not provided. This source however, concludes 
that an ethnically mixed country had become almost completely ”un-­‐mixed” in just four years 
(UNHCR 2013:1). The expectation was for this to change, and getting people to return was a 
goal for the international community. There right to return to pre-war property was, 
moreover, stated in Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA 1995:Annex 7). Moreover, 
there was a prevalent normative opinion that returns, and especially minority returns, was 
desirable, regardless of the fact that some people might have built a life somewhere else. A 
long process of law making ensued, facilitated by the Office of the High Representative 
(OHR), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Laws were passed, ensuring the right of 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP´s) to return to their pre-war property. The 
obstacles proved to be many. 
One year after the signing of the GFAP, only about 250 000 of the two million 
displaced citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina had returned. The majority of these were 
“spontaneous”, meaning that they occurred without aid from UNHCR7. It soon became clear 
that most of those who went back did so only if they could go to a place where they would be 
part of the ethnic majority (UNHCR 2013:4). Minority returns were more difficult. The 
Helsinki Committee estimate that only 15 000 out of the 475 000 refugees returning between 
1995 and 1998 were minority returns (Helsinki International Federation for Human Rights 
1999:10). Different areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina had seen fighting between different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Local organizations were, however, instrumental.  
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militias. Thus, there was no one group that needed resettling. All groups were evictors, and 
all groups were evictees (Hastings 2001).  
There was a standardized process through which claims for property could be filed, 
but the system was inefficient and suffered from chaos and obstruction. For example, police 
officers often refused to evict occupants from their own ethnic group. Many politicians 
openly flouted the laws by living in occupied apartments themselves. Most politicians were 
elected for two years at a time, and could not be seen as willingly implementing the property 
regulations. One source addressing the situation in Republika Srpska in 1996 notes that the 
small Social Liberal Party was, the only party in Republika Srpska that advocated return of 
dispelled Muslims and Croats (International Crisis Group 1996). In early 1999, time 
estimates for when processing of claims would be finalised with the current pace were bleak 
in early 1999 – some 22 years for FBiH and 40 years for RS. 1999 however, became a 
turning point. The international community formed a unified front (consisting of OSCE, 
UNHCR, OHR and UNMIBH), and in essence did all it took to process claims and 
implement them. No exceptions were made in the implementations, even in the most 
sympathetic cases. The endeavour was called the Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP) 
(Hastings 2001). The statistics from the Property Law Implementation Plan (see below) 
might lead us to very positive conclusions about the number of minority returns. However, 
we need to remember the difference between purported and “real” returns.  
4.4 Problematic definitions in official sources 
Previous to doing fieldwork, I contacted knowledgeable people within BiH, asking them to 
send me anything they might have on the issue. Their answers were more or less the same: 
“There is no data on this”. The results from the last Census, held in October 2013, could have 
been a valuable source. However, these results are not likely to be ready until the end of 
2014. One document, dated 2002, claims that between 2000 and 2002, a 36% increase in 
minority returns took place (OSCE, OHR, UNCHR, UNMiBH, IJC, CoE 2002:4). Both in the 
document referred to above and in a statistics package that UNCHR released in 2012 
(UNHCR 2012), the category of “minority return” is not defined, and the reported number of 
minority returns is very high. I attempted through several months to contact UNCHR in BiH, 
to inquire about definitions and methods. Despite using creative methods and exhausting 
available network, I have not received a single reply. A UNHCR document from 2013 gives 
us a hint about the operationalization of the concept: A minority return is counted as a person 
	  	   52	  
who returns to an entity where another ethnic group is “in control”. I.e. a Serb returning to 
her previous home in the Federation is a minority return. A Bosniac returning to his home in 
the Federation, isn´t (UNHCR 2013). I contacted the author to inquire, but received no reply. 
However, if this is the definition underlying the 2012 number for minority returns, then it is 
problematic. It is entirely possible to be a minority return when you are a Bosniac returning 
to some place in the FBiH. It varies from municipality to municipality who is majority. 
Counting as minority return a Bosniac returning to some place in Republika Srpska, however, 
is easier to justify. The numbers above thus may be useful, in that the document indicates 
how many Bosniacs returned to RS for each year. The 2012 Statistics Package, however, 
claims that as of 2012, roughly half of those who have returned are minority returns (for 
table, see below)  (UNHCR 2012). This figure should be doubted, due to the methodological 
issues outlined above. The data presented below should also contribute to cast doubt on the 
findings. Summing up, it seems possible to argue for a discrepancy between “official” (that 
of PLIP and UNHCR) and “on the ground” estimates for minority returns. The most viable 
way to assess how many minority returns there really were, seems to be through a 
combination of election results with regards to in/out-voting, as well as through interviews. 
 
Table 1: PROPERTY LAW IMPLEMENTATION PLAN. SOURCE: PLIP STATISTICS 
PACKAGE 2006 
National totals, Implementation Ratio of the Property Law Implementation Plan in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, in 2006 
 
Grand 
total Private property only 
 
Total number of claims 211 791 114,636 
Implementation ratio (cases closed) 93,34% 96,10% 
Positive decisions, in numbers  197,815 110,227 
Negative decisions, in numbers  12,642 3,485 
NOTE:	  	   The	  implementation	  ratio	  in	  PLIP	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  number	  of	  
closed	  cases	  (in	  which	  a	  decision	  has	  been	  made	  and	  the	  
appropriate	  action	  taken),	  divided	  by	  the	  total	  number	  of	  cases,	  
stated	  in	  per	  cent.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  numbers	  are	  
significantly	  higher	  for	  private	  property	  than	  in	  the	  grand	  total.	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This	  is	  due	  to	  a	  large	  number	  of	  “socially	  owned	  properties”,	  
which	  was	  also	  a	  part	  of	  the	  process.	  
4.5 Findings 
4.5.1 Election data 
Below are tables that show the development of votes cast from outside the municipality. The 
basis of numbers for general elections is House of Representatives BiH, except for 1998, 
when there was no available data for this level, and I used results from Entity Parliaments. In 
municipal elections, the basis of numbers is Municipal Councils. Table 2 show the 
development in Republika Srpska. Table 3 show the development in the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Table 4 show total numbers. 1996 is not included, as data from this year 
are not available. For 2006, only national totals were available – and this number is not 
consistent throughout sources. Both totals are stated for transparency.  
 
 





votes  Total 
% of votes 
cast  
from outside  
1997, municipal elections 678,881 253,985 932,866 27,0% 
1998, NA RS, HoR FBiH 547,247 193,818 741,065 26,1% 
2000, municipal elections 567,289 116,095 683,384 17,0% 
2002, HoR BiH 450,451 61,348 511,799 12,0% 
2004, municipal elections 430,498 27,475 457,973 6,0% 
2006, HoR BiH     591,733 0% 
2008, municipal elections  588,208 23,124 611,332 3,8% 
2010, HoR BiH 602,092 5,234 607,326 0,9% 
2012, municipal elections  669,763 22,646 692,409 3,3% 
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Table 3: VOTES FROM REFUGEES AND IDP´S IN FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND 





votes  Total 
% of votes 
cast from 
outside  
1997, municipal elections 979,638 189,360 1,168,998 16% 
1998, NA RS, HoR FBiH 776,220 151,347 927,567 16,3% 
2000, municipal elections 753,958 87,167 841,125 10,3% 
2002, HoR BiH 686,003 31,121 717,124 4,3% 
2004, municipal elections 538,257 16,016 554,273 2,8% 
2006, HoR BiH     921,864 0% 
2008, municipal elections  905,894 13,501 919,395 1,5% 
2010, HoR BiH 1,005,334 10,368 1,015,702 1,0% 
2012, municipal elections  908,118 13,466 921,584 1,5% 
 





votes  Total 
% of votes 
cast from 
outside  
1997, municipal elections 1,680,796 456,996 2,137,792 21,3% 
1998, NA RS, HoR FBiH 1,323,467 345,165 1,668,632 20,8% 
2000, municipal elections 1,321,247 203,262 1,524,509 13,3% 
2002, HoR BiH 1,136,454 92,469 1,228,923 7,5% 
2004, municipal elections 968,755 43,491 1,012,246 4,3% 
2006, HoR BiH 1,470,962 37,789 1,508,751 2,0% 
2008, municipal elections  1,541,792 37,890 1,579,682 2,4% 
2010, HoR BiH 1,607,426 15,602 1,623,028 0,9% 
2012, municipal elections  1,577,881 36,112 1,613,993 2,2% 
NOTE:  
In 2006 the sum is not consistent because of different sources. 
Alternative sum: 1,513,597   
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Data are gathered from various sources (Central Election Commission 2014; OSCE 1997, 
1998, 2000; Wikipedia 2006), and then compiled. 
The next batch of tables (Tables 5-9) breaks down support for parties based on 
inside/outside support. Only municipal elections have been considered, to make the 
measurement as local as possible. The aim is to look for development of inside votes for 
parties with affiliation to the group that is surmised to be minority This should give us an 
indicator of the degree of “real” return. For example: If the amount of votes for Bosniac 
parties, cast from inside of municipalities in the RS, increase through the post-war period, 
this means an increase in Bosniac “real” return. It could be argued that by supposing who are 
minority and majority like this, I am falling in the same trap as the UNCHR with its very 
broad definitions of who are minority and majority in which entity. However, I would argue 
that voting behaviour constitutes a better source for assessing trends in “real” returns than a 
system of counting heads, as it represents someone making a statement, in contrast to being 
counted, passively, according to who-knows-what-criteria. It may not lead us to absolute 
numbers that are correct. However, they let us discern trends, and the numbers will be 
correct, proportionally, to those of the other groups in the entity (assuming that voter turnout 
is the same for all groups). A summary will be provided (Table 10). 	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Table 5: DEVELOPMENT IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR BROKEN DOWN ON INSIDE/OUTSIDE 
VOTING 










1997 Municipal             
 
Bosniac             
Stranka za Bosnu i Herzegovinu - SBiH 956 3472 4428 1663 268 1931 
Stranka Demokratske Akcije - SDA 1876 4729 6605 5804 780 6584 
Coalitions dominated by SDA and SBiH 
(both of them in each) 8545 164637 173182 477435 101035 578470 
Narodnoj stranci Radom za boljitak     0     0 
Savez za Bolju Buducnost Bosne i 
Hercegovine - SBB BiH      0     0 
Total Bosniac parties 11,377 172,838 184,215 484,902 102,083 586,985 
 
Serb             
Partija Drustvenoc Progresa PDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Srpska Radikalna Stranka Republike Srpske 
SRS 141707 6957 148664 3868 212 4080 
SDS - Srpska Demoratska Stranka  250689 11839 262528 4376 239 4615 
SNSD - Milorad Dodik 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Socijalisticka partija republike srpske 109267 4056 113323 304 28 332 
SNS - Biljana Plavsic 471 26 497 0 0 0 
Demokratsk Narodni Savez Republike 
Srpske  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coalitions of SNSD, PDP and SNS 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Narodni savez za Slobodan Mir  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Demokratski patriotski blok republike srpske 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Serb Parties 502134 22878 525012 8548 479 9027 
 
Croat           0 
HDZBiH - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 
BiH 828 19242 20070 213561 48290 261851 
Hrvatska Stranka Prava HSP (BiH Dapic Dr. 
Jurisic) 0 0 0 7513 657 8170 
HSS Bosne i Herzegovine. From 2007 
merged with NHI  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa (NHI) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HDZ 1990 - Hrvatska Demokratska 
Zajednica 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coalitions dominated by HDZ     0     0 
Coalitions dominated by NHI or HSS     0 55959 3020 58979 
Coalitions across HDZ and NHI etc.     0     0 
Coalitions dominated by HDZ1990 or HSP     0     0 
Total Croat parties 828 19242 20070 277033 51967 329000 
 
Multi-ethnic           0 
008 SDP - Socialdemokratska Partija Bosne i 
Herzegovine i  1876 4729 6605 108135 8045 116180 
Total multi-ethnic 1,876 4,729 6,605 108,135 8,045 116,180 
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Table 6: DEVELOPMENT IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR BROKEN DOWN ON INSIDE/OUTSIDE 
VOTING 










2000 Municipal             
 
Bosniac             
Stranka za Bosnu i Herzegovinu - SBiH     0 78793 5096 83889 
Stranka Demokratske Akcije - SDA     0 171124 11603 182727 
Coalitions dominated by SDA and SBiH 
(both of them in each) 4206 63945 68151 57555 16777 74332 
Narodnoj stranci Radom za boljitak     0     0 
Savez za Bolju Buducnost Bosne i 
Hercegovine - SBB BiH      0     0 
Total Bosniac parties 4,206 63,945 68,151 307,472 33,476 340,948 
 
Serb             
Partija Drustvenoc Progresa PDP 54648 878 55526 0 0 0 
Srpska Radikalna Stranka Republike Srpske 
SRS 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SDS - Srpska Demoratska Stranka  257298 3621 260919 0 0 0 
SNSD - Milorad Dodik 93535 1977 95512 2192 5439 7631 
Socijalisticka partija republike srpske 60254 1321 61575 604 4402 5006 
SNS - Biljana Plavsic 48733 720 49453 0 0 0 
Demokratsk Narodni Savez Republike 
Srpske  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coalitions of SNSD, PDP and SNS 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Narodni savez za Slobodan Mir  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Demokratski patriotski blok republike srpske 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Serb Parties 514468 8517 522985 2796 9841 12637 
 
Croat     0     0 
HDZBiH - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 
BiH 254 5224 5478 106753 11779 118532 
Hrvatska Stranka Prava HSP (BiH Dapic Dr. 
Jurisic) 0 0 0 7590 481 8071 
HSS Bosne i Herzegovine. From 2007 
merged with NHI  18 1188 1206 2193 289 2482 
Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa (NHI) 354 7401 7755 13285 2563 15848 
HDZ 1990 - Hrvatska Demokratska 
Zajednica 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coalitions dominated by HDZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coalitions dominated by NHI or HSS 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coalitions across HDZ and NHI etc. 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coalitions dominated by HDZ1990 or HSP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Croat parties 626 13813 14439 129821 15112 144933 
 
Multi-ethnic     0     0 
008 SDP - Socialdemokratska Partija Bosne i 
Herzegovine i  4418 22695 27113 231750 20394 252144 
Total multi-ethnic 4,418 22,695 27,113 231,750 20,394 252,144 
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Table 7: DEVELOPMENT IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR BROKEN DOWN ON INSIDE/OUTSIDE 
VOTING 










2004 Municipal             
 
Bosniac             
Stranka za Bosnu i Herzegovinu - SBiH 4515 3323 7838 56203 2163 58366 
Stranka Demokratske Akcije - SDA 14176 16866 31042 185414 6805 192219 
Coalitions dominated by SDA and SBiH 
(both of them in each)             
Narodnoj stranci Radom za boljitak 5427 109 5536 10282 246 10528 
Savez za Bolju Buducnost Bosne i 
Hercegovine - SBB BiH              
Total Bosniac parties 24,118 20,298 44,416 251,899 9,214 261,113 
 
Serb             
Partija Drustvenoc Progresa PDP 45036 128 45164 1074 115 1189 
Srpska Radikalna Stranka Republike Srpske 
SRS 14202 55 14257 0 0 0 
SDS - Srpska Demoratska Stranka  120362 589 120951 451 24 475 
SNSD - Milorad Dodik 124231 577 124808 4946 458 5404 
Socijalisticka partija republike srpske 24147 110 24257 673 90 763 
SNS - Biljana Plavsic 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Demokratsk Narodni Savez Republike 
Srpske  20762 79 20841 46 0 46 
Coalitions of SNSD, PDP and SNS 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Narodni savez za Slobodan Mir  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Demokratski patriotski blok republike srpske 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Serb Parties 348740 1538 350278 7190 687 7877 
 
Croat     0       
HDZBiH - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 
BiH 200 256 456 56456 1266 57722 
Hrvatska Stranka Prava HSP (BiH Dapic Dr. 
Jurisic) 0 0 0 654 11 665 
HSS Bosne i Herzegovine. From 2007 
merged with NHI  94 44 138 2548 52 2600 
Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa (NHI) 858 297 1155 2691 70 2761 
HDZ 1990 - Hrvatska Demokratska 
Zajednica 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coalitions dominated by HDZ 0 0 0 17630 201 17831 
Coalitions dominated by NHI or HSS 48 415 463 2820 65 2885 
Coalitions across HDZ and NHI etc.     0     0 
Coalitions dominated by HDZ1990 or HSP     0     0 
Total Croat parties 1200 1012 2212 82799 1665 84464 
 
Multi-ethnic     0       
008 SDP - Socialdemokratska Partija Bosne i 
Herzegovine i  8762 3549 12311 100467 2572 103039 
Total multi-ethnic 8,762 3,549 12,311 100,467 2,572 103,039 
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Table 8: DEVELOPMENT IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR BROKEN DOWN ON INSIDE/OUTSIDE 
VOTING 










2008 Municipal             
 
Bosniac             
Stranka za Bosnu i Herzegovinu - SBiH 562 124 686 77522 1411 78933 
Stranka Demokratske Akcije - SDA 1637 419 2056 259534 3674 263208 
Coalitions dominated by SDA and SBiH 
(both of them in each) 18736 8645 27381 8669 436 9105 
Narodnoj stranci Radom za boljitak 8459 156 8615 45370 311 45681 
Savez za Bolju Buducnost Bosne i 
Hercegovine - SBB BiH              
Total Bosniac parties 29,394 9,344 38,738 391,095 5,832 396,927 
 
Serb             
Partija Drustvenoc Progresa PDP 59390 445 59835 430 35 465 
Srpska Radikalna Stranka Republike Srpske 
SRS 18592 118 18710 0 0 0 
SDS - Srpska Demoratska Stranka  129341 943 130284 352 57 409 
SNSD - Milorad Dodik 194232 1514 195746 7582 693 8275 
Socijalisticka partija republike srpske 26044 219 26263 257 15 272 
SNS - Biljana Plavsic 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Demokratsk Narodni Savez Republike 
Srpske  40944 226 41170 634 74 708 
Coalitions of SNSD, PDP and SNS 0 0 0 2482 83 2565 
Narodni savez za Slobodan Mir  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Demokratski patriotski blok republike srpske 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Serb Parties 468543 3465 472008 11737 957 12694 
 
Croat             
HDZBiH - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 
BiH 0 0 0 77209 1064 78273 
Hrvatska Stranka Prava HSP (BiH Dapic Dr. 
Jurisic) 0 0 0 15341 0 15341 
HSS Bosne i Herzegovine. From 2007 
merged with NHI  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa (NHI) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HDZ 1990 - Hrvatska Demokratska 
Zajednica 1990 61 41 102 30215 262 30477 
Coalitions dominated by HDZ 2281 4878 7159 6655 538 7193 
Coalitions dominated by NHI or HSS     0 5187 27 5214 
Coalitions across HDZ and NHI etc.     0 2349 52 2401 
Coalitions dominated by HDZ1990 or HSP     0 2845 1 2846 
Total Croat parties 2342 4919 7261 139801 1944 141745 
 
Multi-ethnic             
008 SDP - Socialdemokratska Partija Bosne i 
Herzegovine i  14497 2788 17285 162823 2009 164832 
Total multi-ethnic 14,497 2,788 17,285 162,823 2,009 164,832 
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Table 9: DEVELOPMENT IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR BROKEN DOWN ON INSIDE/OUTSIDE 
VOTING IN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 










2012 Municipal             
 
Bosniac             
Stranka za Bosnu i Herzegovinu - SBiH 5257 987 6244 51790 742 52532 
Stranka Demokratske Akcije - SDA 23503 3113 26616 257286 3056 260342 
Coalitions dominated by SDA and SBiH 
(both of them in each) 4445 1738 6183 725 58 783 
Narodnoj stranci Radom za boljitak 5067 169 5236 31226 263 31489 
Savez za Bolju Buducnost Bosne i 
Hercegovine - SBB BiH  6438 826 7264 79016 904 79920 
Total Bosniac parties 44,710 6,833 51,543 420,043 5,023 425,066 
 
Serb             
Partija Drustvenoc Progresa PDP 59432 700 60132 204 12 216 
Srpska Radikalna Stranka Republike Srpske 
SRS 4417 39 4456 0 0 0 
SDS - Srpska Demoratska Stranka  140204 1377 141581 190 4 194 
SNSD - Milorad Dodik 177071 1896 178967 5709 449 6158 
Socijalisticka partija republike srpske 36678 343 37021 664 58 722 
SNS - Biljana Plavsic 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Demokratsk Narodni Savez Republike 
Srpske  61475 405 61880 1419 91 1510 
Coalitions of SNSD, PDP and SNS 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Narodni savez za Slobodan Mir  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Demokratski patriotski blok republike srpske 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Serb Parties 479277 4760 484037 8186 614 8800 
 
Croat             
HDZBiH - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 
BiH 1841 2352 4193 80339 2145 82484 
Hrvatska Stranka Prava HSP (BiH Dapic Dr. 
Jurisic) 124 68 192 15869 253 16122 
HSS Bosne i Herzegovine. From 2007 
merged with NHI  11 0 11 631 4 635 
Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa (NHI) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HDZ 1990 - Hrvatska Demokratska 
Zajednica 1990 0 0 0 24139 410 24549 
Coalitions dominated by HDZ     0     0 
Coalitions dominated by NHI or HSS     0     0 
Coalitions across HDZ and NHI etc.     0     0 
Coalitions dominated by HDZ1990 or HSP     0     0 
Total Croat parties 1976 2420 4396 120978 2812 123790 
 
Multi-ethnic             
008 SDP - Socialdemokratska Partija Bosne i 
Herzegovine i  16002 2145 18147 159322 2061 161383 
Total multi-ethnic 16,002 2,145 18,147 159,322 2,061 161,383 
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A summarising table is in order:   
 
4.5.2 Interviews  
OSCE personnel who agreed to interviews were vital in the process of collecting my own 
data, as were other members of the international community. The question I asked was “How 
many of those who got their property back do you think actually went back, if this meant 
going back to an area where they would be ethnic minority?” Halisa Skopljak8 emphasizes 
that when talking about returns in general, there has been substantial success. – For example, 
for the areas in Sarajevo that was controlled by Serbs during the war, the return rate is close 
to 100% (Skopljak 2014). However, Skopljak estimates that on a national basis, only around 
30% of those that would comprise an ethnic minority, actually went back to live following a 
positive decision on their claim. The rest traded or sold it. – Ethnicity is still a major issue 
when people are making choices about where to live in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is 
politicised, easy to mobilize around, and my experience since 1995 shows that if anything, 
ethnicity is more important now than it was in 1995 (Skopljak 2014). She agrees with the 
general image of Bosnia and Herzegovina being a society where the community where you 
live is an important source for support and security. – So, I have always admired people who 
settle somewhere where they will be minority. Being a minority in this country is very 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Halisa Skopljak is currently employed as National Legal Officer with OSCE. Between 2000 and 2005, she 
worked with the issue of returns in OSCE.  
Table 10: SUMMARIES OF TABLES 5-9 
Development in minority “inside votes”:  
 
1997 2000  2004 2008 2012 
 
Bosniac “inside votes” in 







24 118 29 394 44 710 
 
      
 
Serb “inside votes” in 
FBiH 
8548 2796  7190 11 737 8186 
 
      
       




828 626  1200 2342 1976 
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difficult, she says (Skopljak 2014). Damir Gnjidic9 thinks 30% is too optimistic as a national 
figure, when it comes to minority returns. - I would say that 90% of would-be-minorities that 
got their property back took that property, and either traded it with someone of the majority 
population for some other piece of property somewhere else, or sold it.  In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, it is very important to live in a supportive community. That way, you know that 
whatever happens, you will have people around you to lean on. This is a lot of the reason 
why being an ethnic minority is not an option, he says (Gnjidic 2014). Aleksandra Krstovic10 
has viewed the returnee situation up close for several years, as education is major issue for 
those pondering whether or not to return to their pre-war place of residence – I would guess 
that less than 30% of those who would be minorities and got rights to their previous 
properties, actually went back. The rest sold or traded it, she estimates. Ethnicity was 
probably the main reason for this. It is very hard to be an ethnic minority where you live in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. My guess is that when the results of the 2013 Census come out, 
they will show an ethnically cleansed reality (Krstovic 2014). Amir Kulaglic11 notes how in 
Srebrenica municipality (located in the RS with Serbian majority), the Croat and Bosniac 
women who live there are afraid to visit Serb doctors. They travel to Tuzla instead, which is 
located in the Federation (Kulaglic 2014). To sum up: A positive decision on claim for 
property spurred a decision-making process of what to do for the people involved. The 
options, broadly speaking, were to move back to live, use it as a weekend- or seasonal house, 
to trade it with someone else´s property in another area, or to sell it. All the interviewees 
underlined that ethnicity was a – if not the most – significant factor when making this choice. 
All of them estimate that a low amount (less than 30%) of would-be-minorities with rights to 
property actually went back to settle.  
4.6 Summary 
To address Table 2-4: It could be argued that a decreased number of outside voters from 
could be because that a large number of people have returned. This would make them regular 
voters. For the reduction seen from 1997 to 2000, this might be some of the explanation – at 
least in FBiH, where most of the returns, both of displaced persons and refugees, happened in 
the four years after 1995. In RS, the years between 1999 and 2003 were those in which most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Damir Gnjidic holds a position as Legal Advisor for Public and Administrative Law in OHR. 
10 Aleksandra Krstovic is currently employed as National Programme Officer in the Education Sector in OSCE.  
11 Amir Kulaglic is the closest advisor to the Mayor of Srebrenica, Camil Durakovic.   
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refugees and displaced persons returned (UNHCR 2012:3). However, this variable measures 
a specific type of return as an indicator for reconciliation and quality of democracy: The 
return of those who had incentive for returning in the form of rights to property, but who 
would comprise a minority if they did. As such, table 2-4 provide only very broad answers.  
Tables 5 through 10 suggest that the amount of “real” returns to wherever a person 
would be minority has increased for all groups. However, the numbers are very small. 
Consider, for example, the ratio between “inside” votes for Bosniac parties in RS, 2012 (44 
710) and the number of “inside” votes for Serb parties in the same year (479 277). Note that 
the largest number in table 10 was chosen for comparison. This shows that even though many 
have returned, the ratio is still overwhelmingly skewed. The above suggest a situation in 
which few would-be-minorities have chosen to return, even though they obtained rights to 
property.  
Seen in the light of table 5-10, the decreased number of outside voters suggests that 
many of those that have not chosen to return, have no intention of returning. The cessation of 
voting in absentee represents a process of breaking the bonds to this municipality. The 
findings on this variable should be compared to the 2013 Census, when the results come out. 
Ostensibly, it will support the conclusion that the so-called “ethnic cleansing” of the 1992-
1995 succeeded in changing the demographic patterns of BiH.   
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5 ELECTIONS – X2 
With reference to the theoretical framework posed, elections have been chosen as an 
independent variable to measure. 
5.1 Method 
For obtaining data on this variable, I have relied on two sources: a) election results for the 
past 18 years, provided by the Central Election Commission (CEC) and OSCE Mission to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and b) scores on how ethnically radical each party is, from three 
people who have all observed political life in BiH through many years. 
Table 1 contains an assessment of how nationalistic the selected parties are. The 
informants and scoring system will be introduced in the text below, although the latter has 
been presented in Chapter 3 as well. Table 2 contains development of voting behaviour. See 
the same chapter for information about the how I obtained, selected and analysed the election 
results. Note that the total number of votes for selected parties forms a new 100%, then used 
as basis for analysis of proportional shares of support. As such, “my” 100% does not equal 
national 100%. Results are stated in per cent. For results in numbers, see Appendix 1. As 
stated in Chapter 3, the labelling of parties as “hardliners” is done by looking at the trend of 
the scores given them from my three informants on this issue. This might not be the same 
number of parties for all three groups. Parties with no supposed ethnic affiliation, so called 
multi-ethnic parties, are included in a separate table. 
5.2 Backdrop 
In contrast to the chapter on Schools – x4 and Minority Returns – x1, I will not spend too 
long presenting specifics. The first elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the war were 
held in September 1996, less than one year after the GFAP was signed. The most influential 
parties of, at least, the 1996, 1997 and 1998 elections had been formed before or during the 
war. OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina was responsible for the 1996, 1997, 1998 and 
2000, after which the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina took over.  
The majority of election results have been transferred from OSCE to CEC, but there 
exists a certain degree of overlap. The CEC were unable to provide me with results for all 
years. However, working with other sources as well, I have been able to fill in at least some 
holes for the missing years. This pertains to 1996 and 2006. 
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The first couple of years after the war, elections were held somewhat irregularly, but have 
since been held at four-year intervals. 
 
5.3 Findings 
TABLE 1: PARTY ASSESSMENTS – SCORES 






1996 to 2002/ 
2002 to 2012 
Ahmed Rifatbegovic  
1996 to 2002/ 
2002 to 2012 
SDS 9 9/8 10/7 
SNSD 9 5/9 3/9 
SRS 10 9/9 8/5 
HDZ 10 8/9 8/8 
HSP 10 8/7 8/5 
SBIH 8 7/7 4/4 
SDA 8 8/5 7/6 
SDP 5 5/8 0/1 
PDP - MLADEN IVANIC   7/6 7/5 
SNS - BILJANA PLAVSIC   9/9 7/8 
NARODNOJ STRANCI RADOM ZA BOLJITAK 5/5 3/2 
DEMOKRATSK NARODNI SAVEZ RS 7/7 5/6 
HDZ 1990   8/7 7/4 
HSS   6/6 3/4 
NHI   5/5 3/3 
SBB   
NOT 
FOUNDED/7 NOT FOUNDED/3 
NOTE:	  	   Sources	  have	  evaluated	  at	  request.	  One	  of	  the	  sources	  was	  
unavailable	  to	  provide	  me	  with	  the	  last	  batch	  of	  scores.	  Two	  of	  the	  
sources	  wished	  to	  include	  a	  temporal	  dimension,	  giving	  one	  score	  
for	  an	  “early”	  post-­‐war	  phase	  (1996-­‐2002),	  and	  one	  for	  a	  “recent”	  
post-­‐war	  phase	  (2002-­‐2012).	  0	  means	  “caters	  to	  no	  communal	  
group	  at	  all”,	  10	  means	  “caters	  to	  a	  communal	  group,	  politics	  
highly	  influenced	  by	  perceived	  group	  interests”.	  Sources:	  E.	  Druzic	  
is	  currently	  working	  as	  a	  Programme	  Assistant	  in	  OSCE	  BiH.	  She	  
has	  previously	  worked	  in	  UNIPTF,	  EUPM,	  OHR,	  as	  well	  as	  holding	  
various	  positions	  in	  OSCE.	  Srdjan	  Dizdarevic	  is	  President	  of	  the	  
Helsinki	  Committee	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  and	  has	  observed	  
political	  life	  in	  BiH	  over	  a	  number	  of	  years,	  from	  a	  viewpoint	  
outside	  of	  party	  politics.	  Ahmed	  Rifatbegovic	  is	  a	  Parliamentary	  
Programs	  Coordinator	  with	  OSCE.	  Part	  of	  his	  job	  description	  is	  to	  
observe	  the	  political	  processes	  in	  central	  as	  well	  as	  entity	  
governments	  (Dzdarevic	  2013;	  Rifatbegovic	  2014;	  Druzic	  2014).	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Table 2 presents findings of developments in voter behaviour. 
 
TABLE 2: DEVELOPMENT IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR 
 

















                    
Stranka za Bosnu i 
Herzegovinu - SBiH 4.08 0.35 0.00 6.06 12.49 7.65 17.95 6.22 5.81 4.66 
Stranka Demokratske Akcije - 
SDA 39.56 0.86 0.00 13.21 24.73 25.79 19.50 20.88 14.74 22.23 
Coalitions dominated by SDA 
and SBiH (both of them in 
each) 0.00 41.89 39.51 10.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.85 0.00 0.47 
Narodnoj stranci Radom za 
boljitak 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.86 2.70 4.26 3.42 2.81 
Savez za Bolju Buducnost 
Bosne i Hercegovine - SBB 
BiH  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.99 7.00 
Total Bosniac Parties 43.64 43.10 39.51 29.57 37.22 35.29 40.14 34.22 32.96 37.17 
Support for "hardliner" 
parties (SDA and 
SBIH+SDA-coalitions) 39.56 42.75 39.51 23.51 24.73 25.79 19.50 23.73 14.74 22.70 
 
Serb parties 
                     
Partija Drustvenoc Progresa 
PDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.01 5.20 5.35 2.32 4.71 2.78 4.61 
Srpska Radikalna Stranka 
Republike Srpske SRS 2.71 8.63 6.60 0.00 2.27 1.65 1.29 1.46 0.73 0.35 
SDS - Srpska Demoratska 
Stranka  25.16 15.25 10.90 18.86 15.98 14.03 8.88 10.21 9.59 11.19 
SNSD - Milorad Dodik 0.00 0.01 3.66 7.46 11.05 15.04 22.03 16.45 19.22 14.14 
Socijalisticka partija republike 
srpske 0.00 6.25 6.10 4.81 2.03 2.89 0.00 2.07 1.01 2.88 
SNS - Biljana Plavsic 0.00 0.03 6.49 3.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Demokratsk Narodni Savez 
Republike Srpske  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.60 2.41 1.64 3.27 2.06 4.84 
Coalitions of SNSD, PDP and 
SNS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.16 
Narodni savez za Slobodan Mir 5.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Demokratski patriotski blok 
republike srpske 1.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total Serb Parties 35.07 30.17 33.74 38.72 38.13 41.37 36.17 38.37 35.40 38.18 
Support for "hardliner" Serb 
parties (SNS - Biljana 
Plavsic, SDS, and between 
2002 and 2012: SNSD.)  25.16 15.28 17.38 22.44 27.03 29.07 30.91 26.65 28.81 25.33 
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TABLE 2: DEVELOPMENT IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR 
 



















HDZ BiH - Hrvatska 
Demokratska Zajednica BiH 14.71 15.62 13.31 8.96 0.00 6.72 0.00 6.43 8.04 6.85 
Hrvatska Stranka Prava HSP 
(BiH Dapic Dr. Jurisic) 0.65 0.45 0.69 0.58 0.00 0.08 2.00 1.20 0.00 1.25 
Hrvatska seljacka stranka 
Bosne i Herzegovine from 
2007 HSS - NHI Party cod 
1290 till 2000 0.00 0.38 0.23 0.27 0.63 0.32 0.00 0.41 0.33 0.45 
Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa 
(NHI) 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.71 1.55 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
HDZ 1990 - Hrvatska 
Demokratska Zajednica 1990 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.31 2.39 0.00 1.91 
Coalitions dominated by HDZ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.69 2.06 5.67 1.12 0.00 0.00 
Coalitions dominated by NHI 
or HSS 0.00 3.28 2.58 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00 
Coalitions across HDZ and 
NHI etc. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 
Coalitions dominated by HDZ 
1990 or HSP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 3.52 0.00 
Total Croat parties 15.36 19.73 16.81 11.52 12.87 10.01 11.97 12.36 11.88 10.46 
Support for "hardliner" 
Croat parties (HDZ and HSP, 
as well as coalitions 




                    
SDP - Socialdemokratska 
Partija Bosne i Herzegovine - 
Socijaldemokrati  0.00 7.01 9.95 20.19 11.77 13.32 11.71 15.06 19.77 14.19 
Coalitions between SDS and 
HSS, UBSD, MBO, 
REPUBLIKANCI 5.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total multi-ethnic 5.92 7.01 9.95 20.19 11.77 13.32 11.71 15.06 19.77 14.19 
Total, per cent 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
           
5.4 Summary 
The summary in this chapter must necessarily be somewhat longer than in the others, due to 
the fact that the findings are mainly to be found in tables.  
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5.4.1 Bosniac 
There is less support for Bosniac “hardliner” parties now than right after the war. In addition, 
the party assessment indicates that the parties defined as “hardliners”, SDA and SBIH, have 
gotten less nationalistic over the years. Moreover, the percentage of voters that votes for (my 
selection of) parties catering solely to Bosniacs has nearly halved. As The Social Democratic 
Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP) show an increase in their shares of the total votes, 
this suggests that a number of Bosniacs may have started to vote for SDP instead of any of 
the parties catering only to their own group. SDP has a reputation for mainly competing for 
Bosniac votes, although it is multi-ethnic. The above suggest that Bosniac voting behaviour 
have gotten incrementally less nationalistic in the time that has passed from 1995. 
5.4.2 Serb 
The support for (my selection of) parties that caters solely to Serbs, have increased in the 
years since the war. Moreover, although SDS has developed in a less nationalistic direction 
since 1995, the other Serb parties on the list have either remained the same score or gotten 
more nationalistic (as in the case of SNSD). The support for Serb “hardliner” parties have 
remained steady and high at around 25%, although with a drop in 1997 and 1998 elections. 
These findings suggest that Serb voting behaviour is as nationalistic as it was in 1995, and 
that this has been a quite stable trend. The exception is the low support for “hardliner” parties 
in 1997 and 1998. 
5.4.3 Croat 
The support for (my selection of) parties that caters solely to Croats, have decreased from 
around 15 to around 10 per cent. The support for “hardliner” parties has also decreased from 
around 14 to around 8 per cent. The “hardliner” parties have not, according to my sources, 
undergone a moderation process to any significant degree in the years since 1995. It has to be 
noted that preliminary results from the 2013 Census show that the share of Croats living in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has gone down from 17% in 1991 to 14,6% in 2013 (Avaz 2014). 
This could explain some of the decrease. However, some Croats might also have started 
voting for SDP, even though this is generally considered to be a party competing for Bosniac 
votes. These findings suggest that Croat voting behaviour has become slightly less 
nationalistic in the course of the years since the war. This conclusion, however, is less certain 
than the conclusion for Serb parties. 
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5.4.4 Multi-ethnic 
SDP is the only multi-ethnic party of some size in BiH.  They were the only multi-ethnic 
party that got more than 50,000 votes at some point, and thus made it through the selection 
criteria. For all years, except 1996, the multi-ethnic percentage equals SDP´s percentage. 
Their support is almost tripled from 1995 to 2012. Some of this can probably be attributed to 
the fear, trauma as well as the mental and physical destruction that marked the country´s first 
post-war years. Moreover, its share of the total (of my selected parties) is, in 2012, a mere 
14.19%. The share for Croat, Serb and Bosniac parties is 10.46, 38.18 and 37.17%, 
respectively. 
All in all, findings for the various groups are very different. However, it seems possible to 
draw some overall conclusions: The voting behaviour for Serbs seem to be as nationalistic as 
right after the war, with “hardliner” parties not moderating themselves considerably. The 
voting behaviour of Croats seems to be somewhat less nationalistic, but this conclusion is 
more uncertain. The voting behaviour of Bosniacs seems to be considerably less nationalistic. 
A substantial amount of Bosniac votes now probably goes to SDP, the only real multi-ethnic 
alternative in BiH party politics. The fact that there are not more multi-ethnic parties that pass 
the threshold of 50 000 at any point is also significant. Moreover, the fact that “hardliner” 
parties still harvest such a large share of the grand national total of votes (remember that my 
selection of parties includes, for all elections, more than 80% of the votes in BiH), is a find 
that needs to be discussed in relation to democratic quality and reconciliation.
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6 LAWS – x3 
With reference to the theoretical framework posed, the ability of the Parliament to pass laws 
has been chosen as an independent variable to measure. 
6.1 Method 
For obtaining data on this variable, I have relied on a) official gazettes for laws passed by the 
Parliament of BiH, and b) list of imposed decisions by OHR, and c) official records of the use 
of Vital National Interest clause as well as Entity Voting. An external translator was needed 
to do the sorting of much of this material, as it was presented in local language. Data is 
registered for a number of categories, each of which can be related to the theoretical concepts 
of democracy and reconciliation, as defined in the Theory chapter. Below is justification and 
presentation of the categories. The passing of budgets is not considered. 
Table 1 contains the following categories: 
a) New laws passed. Every law passed in Parliament where the title does not start with 
“changes and amendments” has been included in this category. Many pressing issues 
need to be addressed in BiH. The number of new laws passed suggests the degree to 
which the politicians are able to deliver to the voters what they need – and indeed 
depend on them to do. 
a)  Changes and amendment – laws. Every law passed in Parliament where the title 
starts with “Changes and amendments” has been included in this category. Such laws 
suggests the degree to which the political agents “go through the motions” of 
democratic procedures, without adding any real substance. Surely, some changes and 
amendments will be important ones. However, if changes and amendment-laws make 
up the brunt of the laws that are passed, there is reason to question the efficiency of 
decision-making power – and hence the democratic quality of it. 
Table 2 contains the following categories: 
a) How many times OHR have imposed a law each year. This information suggests the 
number of issues that the High Representative has deemed passing a law so important 
that he imposed it. Naturally, it is also a reflection of OHR´s attitude to imposing laws 
at the time.  
b) How many times Vital National Interest-clause has been evoked. This gives 
information on the ease or difficulty to pass decisions at the central level. 
c)  How many times Entity Voting has effectively stopped a law. This gives information 
on the ease or difficulty to pass decisions at the central level; see reference above. 	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TABLE 1                                     
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
"New" laws 
passed by PA 
 








                                  




0 1 5 2 16 0 20 13 11 7 5 14 2 6 1 0 0 0 
Vital national 
interest 




law  0 0 1 9 0 26 26 26 18 18 19 25 11 34 23 10 0 0 
 
 

















1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 
"New laws" passed by PA. Excludes passing budgets. 
Changes and amendment-laws passed by parliament 
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TABLE 2B:  
 
6.2 Summary 
Table 1 and 1B show that BiH Parliament is, at the moment, merely passing “Changes- and 
Amendment”-laws. Few new, substantial issues are addressed. This does not reflect a society 
where there are no issues that need solving: quite the contrary. It does, however, suggest a 
reality where substantial issues are deadlocked in a system of vetoes and ethnic flanking. 
Moreover, it is likely to assume that the longer this trend is present, the less likely it is that 
people involved in the political play will propose needed laws. There is no imperative to 
initiate a process that, in all likeliness, will come to nothing. 
Table 2 and 2B show that the Vital National Interest (VNI) clause has not been used 
as much as Entity Voting to obstruct laws. This is, ostensibly, because the Constitutional 
Court acts as a watchdog of sorts, with its power to nullify VNI-claims. Quite often, they do 
so, thus unblocking the law making process.12 Entity Voting can be used without any third 
party being able to unblock the process. We see that Entity voting is used extensively through 
several years, and then the number falls. A likely interpretation of this that in the years when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 A telling example, about which no articles in English have yet been written, is that the Constitutional Court 
for the Federation Parliament has been one judge short for nearly three years. In this period, politicians have 
known that they can obstruct laws by evoking Vital National Interest. Ultimately, the claim will be treated, but 
for the time being, the law is blocked. The 21st of March 2014, the Federation Parliament managed to appoint 
the judge that was lacking. Thus, the FBiH now has a functioning Constitutional Court again, and will be able to 











1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 
OHR imposed Vital national interest evoked Entity voting effectively stopping a law  
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Entity Voting was used, there was a forward leaning approach to initiating new laws. 
However, as the number of laws blocked by Entity Voting increased, the motivation to 
initiate new processes seem to have declined. There is simply no use in proposing laws that 
one in advance knew would be blocked by Entity Voting. It is understandable that 
Parliamentary activity, then, revolves around making minor changes to already existing laws. 
More substantial laws would, chances are, not pass.  
Two potentially extremely important Constitutinal Amendments, have failed to 
passed through the period in question. The so-called April Package from 2006 would have 
strengthened the state level of the country and removed the discrimination in the electoral 
system to the presidency. Leaders of the major parties had taken the initiative, but in the end, 
the demand for consensus – or, in practice, the use of vetoes – stopped it.  
The 2009 so-called Butmir process removed the discrimination in the electoral system 
to the House of People and the Presidency, the members of both houses increased. This 
initiative also failed, for similar reasons as the April Package (Vollan and Butenschøn 
2011:159).  
 
As long as we agree that decision-making can be codified as the passing of laws, the above 
suggests a development with an incrementally decreasing degree of decision-making abilities 
in the central government of BiH.  
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7 SCHOOLS – x4 
With reference to the theoretical framework posed, schools have been chosen as an 
independent variable to measure. 
7.1 Method 
For measuring this indicator, I have relied on two sources: a) scholarly contributions and b) 
interviews with people who have knowledge about primary education in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The interest has been in primary education, meaning children from 6-15 (last 
year of middle school). In interview guides I attempted to assess longitudinal developments. 
However, despite the efforts, interviewees primarily addressed the situation during the last 
couple of years. Thus, a longitudinal research design has not been feasible for this indicator. 
Official data, had they existed, would have helped build a longitudinal framework, and 
interviews could thus have taken the role as a more secondary source. However, such data 
does not exist. The measurements – and conclusions – for this indicator will be thus mainly 
pertain to 2006 and onwards.  
A second methodological challenge pertains to the division between curricula 
segregation and physical segregation in schools. When doing interviews, such a conceptual 
division is unrealistic. The people I interviewed most likely treated these two forms of 
segregation as one. However, I did ask questions directly relating to the physical separation 
of school children, to make sure this was specifically addressed.  
7.2 Backdrop 
The GFAP, with its devolution of power, left education to be decided by the local level. In 
Republika Srpska, education is under entity control. In the Federation, the area of Education 
formally sorts under the Federal Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, but in reality, it is 
the cantonal Ministries that decide. Ten cantons are surmised to have Bosniac majority, three 
to have Croat majority, and two are mixed.  The cantons are not required to cooperate with 
each other regarding contents and organisation of education. In some ways, you could say 
that in BiH there are not three, but eleven different systems of education: one in Republika 
Srpska, and one in each canton (Low-Beer 2001:1). 
Low-Beer stresses the continuum from the communist experience to the nationalist 
one in school systems after the war. In history education during communism, nationalisms 
and different experiences from historical periods were minimised. The same is the case after 
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1995, as history now is consistently viewed from within a particular national framework. The 
difference is that this “fragmented memory” goes in different directions – from downplaying 
separate experiences during Yugoslavia to over-emphasising them (Low-Beer 2001:5). 
7.3 The origins and contention around segregation in 
schools 
Returnees, to a large extent, triggered segregation in schools. The tendency of the majority 
population to dominate local schools when it came to teaching staff, curricula and language, 
became a serious impediment to returns several places of BiH. Some returnees refused to 
send their child to a school if they knew she would be taught one-sided ethnic curricula, as 
well as a different language than the parents wanted (Torsti 2009:70-71). An attempt to solve 
this was made with the Interim Agreement on Accommodation of Specific Needs and Rights 
of Returnee Children in 2002. It allowed for a different curriculum (decided by authorities of 
“their” ethnic group) to be taught in controversial subjects such as religion, language and 
history, if the parents wanted this. The Interim Agreement also contained provisions for 
increased employment of returnee teachers, and for the ethnic make up of the school boards 
to reflect the ethnic composition in the communities that the schools were catering to. This 
model laid the ground for separate schooling of ethnic groups, and was adopted with many 
local variations throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the Federation. In July 
2003, 52 schools in the “mixed” cantons Zenica-Doboj, Central Bosnia and Herzegovina-
Neretva all started a policy known as “two schools under one roof”, based on the framework 
of the Interim Agreement (Fischer 2006:308-310). On the one hand, it is a well-intentioned 
attempt to create conditions favourable to returns. On the other, it creates a situation where 
generations coming of age grow up almost completely separate from “the others”. Actors 
such as the OHR, as well as other international organisations, have criticised the 
arrangement, demanding real integration in schools. NGO´s working in the field, however, 
often underline the necessity of gradual and careful change (Fischer 2006:310).   
The wish for acquiring membership in the Council of Europe made change necessary, 
as they demanded an end to segregation and harmonisation of in the education sector a 
prerequisite for accession. Thus, Parliament adopted the Framework Law on Primary and 
Secondary Education in 2003. The law includes provisions for harmonisation of curricula and 
the removal of offensive content in textbooks. Personnel from international organisations, 
comprising a work group, would judge what was offensive. With regards to implementation, 
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language became a major issue. Five cantons initially refused to implement the law, and a 
long process followed. In one of the cantons, OHR chose to use its Bonn Powers to impose 
the law. As of now, all cantons have accepted the law, albeit some continue to refuse the 
implementation of certain by-laws, thus postponing full implementation (Fischer 2006:306-
308). 
7.4 Findings 
As mentioned before, there is a tendency in BiH to view the current situation somewhat 
pessimistically, downplaying, perhaps, whatever progress there is. It is telling that I didn´t 
hear a word about Brcko when I was having conversations about developments in schools. 
Brcko district, which has a separate administration, has succeeded in introducing a uniform 
system of education for all children in its district, following the 2003 law (Ivankovic-
Tamamovic 2013). Brcko has accomplished this although it is multi-ethnic and saw heavy 
fighting during the war, proving that an integrated education system is possible despite ethnic 
divides. 
7.4.1 Segregation in content 
The wartime practice of importing curricula from Serbia and Croatia continued until the year 
2000, when a law forbade the import of textbooks from another country (Torsti 2009:67). 
This law was influential, as was the 2003 Framework Law. However, analysis of textbooks 
and curricula in BiH show more or less the same thing, although naturally the findings are 
framed differently (for example, some are policy recommendations, some pertain only to 
history teaching, some to langue). In condensed form, the following trends can be discerned 
from the contributors I have analysed: 
• Offensive material has been removed, as the 2003 law requires. The offensive content of 
curricula is, however, still present, but are now merely found in subtleties and between-
the-line-messages that are hard to discern. 
• Us/them-thinking in the textbooks still prevails. 
• Directly offensive elements have largely been removed from textbooks, but the classroom 
continues to be a scene where divergent ethnic narratives are conveyed. 
• Historical narratives remain heavily influenced by ethnic affiliation. 
• With regards to language, the trend is an even greater emphasis on idiosyncratic elements 
of (so called) Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian language. 
• Solutions on how to run a school in a multi-ethnic community remain a local enterprise, 
and most solutions are ad hoc. Thus, getting an overview is difficult. 
 (Perry 2013; Perry 2003; Torsti 2009; Fischer 2006; Low-Beer 2001). 
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7.4.2 Physical segregation 
As writers in the academic field have, by and large, not addressed the physical separation in 
schools, interviews with knowledgeable people seemed like the most viable way to get data 
on this. As previously mentioned, respondents most likely had both segregation in curricula 
and physical segregation in mind when answering questions. As this could pose a potential 
validity problem, it needs to be mentioned. However, as the two concepts measured are fairly 
close to each other, this should not matter too much. Physical separation is defined as the use 
of separate entrances, separate teaching staff, children attending school in shifts, or simply 
using different buildings within a campus area. Following insights in Jessie Hronesova´s 
ethnography about young peoples and identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina  (Hronesova 
2012), physical segregation seems imperative to address. Hronesova stresses that “rigid 
ethno-national identities and boundaries in Bosnia are not constituted and maintained through 
social contact…but rather through a lack of it. It is the lack of communication between 
groups that keeps ethno-national identities in Bosnia rigid” (Hronesova 2012:93). Hronesova 
structures her project conceptually (for example, what does it mean for people of the various 
groups to be a Serb/Croat/Bosniac?) rather than geographically. The conclusion of each 
chapter all carries a common thread: Enemy images, “frozen scripts” as she calls it, are 
upheld by lack of social contact between the groups (Hronesova 2012:55-56). This seems 
easily translatable to the situation in schools where education is organised such that children 
of different ethnic groups don´t see or talk to each other. The people I interviewed both 
confirmed that this practice is omnipresent in schools catering to more than one ethnic group, 
as well as expressing concern over it.  – When kids go to school separate from each other, 
young people end up lacking positive experience with “the other”. Their narrative about the 
other side is only negative. We in the Mission are scared of the implications if, for example, 
violence should break out. When kids have gone to segregated schools, they won´t have any 
positive counterweight to balance the imperative to join the violence, says Aleksandra 
Krstovic13 (Krstovic 2014). She notes the lack of progress in this area, claiming that the 
conditions now are more or less the same as they were ten to fifteen years ago. – So, if you 
have kids in BiH, the place where you live is of great importance because of schools. If you 
pick a place to live where you are majority, you are fine. If you move to a place where you 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Aleksandra Krstovic is a National Programme Officer in the Education Section in the OSCE Mission to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Within the Mission she has also worked with property implementation, elections and 
human rights, after finishing her two degrees in education and psychology, respectively.  
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are minority, your kid will be assimilated. If the minority is large enough, there are usually 
provisions where they can choose to go to a separate school, or get their education in a 
different shift from the rest. But this means your kid will be segregated. This is more or less 
the situation all over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The case of Konjevic Polje14 is telling. In 
Konjevic Polje, there are a lot of rules regarding how many kids of a certain group have to be 
in each class for separate teaching to happen. The parents that have been standing outside the 
offices of the OHR for weeks now, protesting, are not arguing for integration. They want 
separate premises for their Bosniac children. This solution would merely bring more of the 
same: More segregation (Krstovic 2014).  
Damir Gnjidic´s job description involves monitoring important areas in BiH society, 
including schools. He shares many of Krstovic´s views with regards to segregated schools, 
and underlines the fact that if schools are not segregated, they are mono-ethnic, and, in his 
view, this is still segregation.  – Nothing much has happened on this area in years. The kids 
are still separated from an early age if there is more than one group in the community. I 
would actually go as far as to say that segregation in schools, both in terms of what pupils 
learn and which kids they meet in the course of a day, could pose a security threat. If a spark 
comes along, these kids will be much more likely to be violent against another group if they 
don´t have any day-to-day experiences with them (Gnjidic 2013), he says.  
Steinar Bryn15 has many years of hands on experience with segregation in the schools 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. – We see many different varieties of segregation. It varies from 
community to community, but most often we see separate entrances, going to school in shifts, 
the use of different premises. When we held seminars in BiH in March 2014 and came to the 
primary school in Stolac, a Bosniac member of the cleaning staff opened the door for us. She 
had never set foot in the Croat part of the school building (Bryn 2014 ), he explains. Working 
to promote reconciliation in schools, the Nansen Dialogue Centres in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina first and foremost seek to bring students together, physically. For example, 
NDC might offer to teach integrated classes in areas that the community has expressed a need 
for increased competency in, such as IT or English. The experience is that the mere act of 
bringing students from different groups together in the same classroom has an effect of its 
own, regardless of curricula (Bryn 2014 ).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In Konjevic-Polje, Bosniac and Serb children have to share schools.  
15 Steinar Bryn is senior counsellor at Nansen Peace Centre. He has been involved in peace and reconciliation-
work in former Yugoslavia through Nansen Dialogue since 1994. One of the most important foci in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is segregation in schools.  
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Selim Beslagic16 has kept a close eye on developments in the Federation, and doesn´t 
see much improvement when it comes to segregation in schools. - The time it takes before 
nationalism looses its hold on Bosnia and Herzegovina, will be lost time for the generations 
growing up. We are still at zero in terms of the segregation in schools, 18 years after the war 
(Beslagic 2014). 
7.5 Summary 
The schools in BiH have undergone a centrally administered change pertaining to curricular 
content, especially since 2003. Offensive content have been removed or reformulated. 
However, contentious subjects (history, geography, language and literature in particular) are 
still taught separately. Moreover, the prevalence of physical separation of children, so that 
they rarely or not at all meet members of “the other” group during a normal school day, 
seems still to be omnipresent. My informants expressed concern over this. Further, they noted 
how there has been a lack of development in this issue area. Segregation in schools is, they 
claimed, as prevalent now as it were ten to fifteen years ago. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Selim Beslagic was the Mayor of Tuzla between 1990 to 2000.  
	  	   80	  
8 Discussion 
What can we make of data, when they are viewed in light of the theoretical framework? This 
question will be attempted answered below. Direct references for the theoretical elements 
will be left out of the discussion, for fluency. For references to theory, see Chapter 2.    
8.1 Minority returns – x1 
The degree to which would-be-minorities have chosen to return to their property after gaining 
the right to do so, is mainly relevant for assessing degree of reconciliation, as it shows 
willingness and an ability to live together with someone that one´s own group was at war 
with 18 years ago. Reiterating the theory chapter, a positive finding for reconciliation is 
defined by low levels of animosity, as well as the traits cooperation, dialogue and empathy 
between groups. Moreover, it ties in with the theory in that mono ethnic communities 
represent a problem to alternative sources of information. Of course, when dealing with terms 
as vague as this, findings do not land in a binary either/or- universe. Degree of reconciliation 
is a continuum. 
The three findings that must be posited against theory are the following: First, there is 
the table with results from Municipal elections, showing that “inside votes” of ethnic 
minorities increase through the years since 1995, at least for Bosniacs and Croats in the RS. 
Second, there are, for all three groups, a falling number of outside voters through the years 
since 1995. Third, assessments of the interviewees is that 30% or less of would-be-minorities 
gaining right to property actually returned. Regarding the first finding, it must be noted that, 
the total numbers are quite small, suggesting that the latter data do not conflict the conclusion 
that minority returns have been few. For example, “Inside votes” in the RS for Bosniac 
parties increase steadily from year to year, from around 11 000 in 1997 to around 44 000 in 
2012, however, the number of “inside votes” for Serb parties in the same two years are 502 
000 and 479 000.  
Looking at all three areas of data, then it seems possible to conclude that most would-
be-minority returns that got rights to property chose to not go back, trading or selling it 
instead. What does this mean? On this particular variable, findings inspire quite pessimistic 
assessments of the development of reconciliation. However, this variable does not measure 
degree of reconciliation in situations where different groups are already living together. It 
measures the outcome of a poignant situation of choice, in which a lot of factors, such as the 
faces of potential neighbours as well as level of community support, were unknown. 
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Although I initially surmised minority returns to be not that demanding a criterion for 
reconciliation, I learned that in fact, it is. As a case-within-a-case, minority returns would be 
a “Least likely case”, sorting under the category “Crucial case” for reconciliation (Gerring 
2007:115). As several interviewees have pointed out, BiH is a country where people have a 
long tradition of relying on one´s community to solve the quarrels of everyday life. The 
thought of having neighbours from a different group removes – or so it is seen - access to a 
network of human security. Health care, education and municipality offices are other factors, 
where it is reported that people feel uncertain. As such, this is seems to be an argument 
softening the blow of the bleak findings.  
It can be also be argued that the significance of a family´s (or person´s) decision not 
to return is decreasing, in relation to reconciliation, if a numerical value is assigned for each 
year. The reason is that people become gradually more and more rooted where they live, 
through employment, education and social networks. Moreover, if you have sold or traded 
property, the choice has obviously ceased to exist.  
Summing up the discussion, reconciliation in terms of lowered degree of animosity 
between groups is, it can be argued, something that can be answered in the affirmative. There 
are few reports of violence in inter-ethnic neighbourhoods. However, as Galtung points out, 
there is substantial difference between non-hostile coexistence and the kind of coexistence 
marked by empathy, cooperation and dialogue. The overall conclusion regarding minority 
returns when it comes to this project´s definition of reconciliation is that it hasn´t spanned 
deeper or wider in the years that have paste, and that current levels of reconciliation seem to 
be quite low.  
 
8.2 Elections – x2 
Voting behaviour in a post-conflict society such as Bosnia and Herzegovina can allow us to 
make inferences both with regards to reconciliation as well as quality of democracy. 
As shown in the election chapter, Bosniacs vote considerably less nationalistic now than they 
did right after the war, both in terms of numbers and in terms of how nationalistic the 
“hardliner” Bosniac parties are deemed to be. The Croat voters display a similar trend. 
However, this finding is less substantial because a) the Croats have decreased in numbers, 
demographically, and b) the “hardliner” parties, to which most of the support is given, have 
become only slightly less nationalistic – in contrast to the “hardliner” Bosniac parties. Serb 
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voters display a trend of voting that is as nationalistic as right after the war. The Serb 
“hardliner” parties are as nationalistic as ever. The one, large multi-ethnic party, SDP, has 
increased its support almost threefold, although it is still, in proportion to the others, quite 
small. 
Regarding quality of democracy, it seems possible to argue that if most political seats 
are filled with representatives from nationalist parties, democratic quality will suffer. Ethnic 
elites have a tendency to focus on communal interests rather than the common good (see 
reference in Chapter 3). Thus, there is a risk that political agents (politicians) will not be able 
to deliver what the political principals (voters) want, because many of the issues that need 
solving slid through the filter of ethnic interests on the grounds that they are all-
encompassing, not communal. The unrest from February 2014 is telling in this respect. 
Lacking ethnic affiliation, demands could be heard for a serious effort being invested in the 
common problems of unemployment, economic decline and corruption. These issues are the 
obstacles that are probably most felt for citizens in their everyday lives. The fact that people 
took to the streets to address them suggest that they have not been addressed through political 
channels. This is in line with the argument above. The inadequacy of dealing with these 
issues points to another problem of democratic quality from the theory chapter: that of 
transaction costs. A Parliament in which politicians focus on their own ethnic group rather 
than on steering the country in the right direction, will, logically, have trouble confronting 
issues and making decisions pertaining all-encompassing issues. This is especially so when 
there is always the possibility to make use of veto measures. As such, we might end up with a 
country where democracy is followed in procedures, but where outcomes and substance are 
lacking.  
There is something oxymoronic about this picture. Why would a voter cast her vote 
for a nationalistic party, when she has seen in the past that they have failed to produce desired 
outcomes? Why would anyone continue voting nationalistic at all in BiH? When election 
results come out they way they do, surely the citizens themselves must be to blame for the 
unsatisfactory outcomes. About this, I would like to make three points. One is that there 
really only exists one party that claims multi-ethnic affiliation. This is the SDP17. Several 
other multi-ethnic alternatives have tried to get a foothold in elections, but have failed. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Not to state that SDP represents all that is good. SDP was spoken of in very bitter word by many of my 
informants – the reason being that their party tops had proven to be just as bad as the others when they came to 
power, merely strengthening the party instead of trying to solve problems. The point here is that the SDP 
represent the only large party that is outspoken about its multi-ethnic affiliation.  
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Second, the nationalist way of doing party politics can be viewed as a modus operandi that is 
hard to escape from due to both structural and psychological components. The GFAP, with 
its division of power, provides a structural backdrop. The party structure, established around 
1990, militarised during the war, based on ethnic affiliation, fits a little too well into this 
framework. The voters, often living in homogenised communities (see discussions on 
minority returns above), are presented with a plethora of parties. These seem to differ in how 
they imagine the solving of society´s issues. However, as data suggest, the majority of voters 
still make their choice within the repertoire of parties that represent one´s group – for 
example with regards to axis such as centralisation –decentralisation, right wing – left wing 
etc. Third, it is possible – and indeed likely – that the low amount of outcomes and substance 
in the central government of BiH has several, more systemic, causes, such as vested elite 
interests. Other factors set aside; it seems possible to conclude that the longitudinal trend of 
voter support for “hardliner” parties has a cost for democratic quality, and that the 
development during the last 18 years must be deemed overall pertaining to this variable.  
These costs are, above all, spelled out in the chapter about laws. 
Regarding reconciliation, we note that “hardliner” party get high and steady levels of 
support. SDS, SNSD, HDZ and SDA –with the possible exception of the latter – hardly seem 
like agents of cooperation, dialogue and empathy in BiH – the factors necessary for 
reconciliation in a society. It can be asked: Which parties then, do? This is a fair point, as 
political parties without ethnic affiliation – and thus, necessarily, inherent enemy images - 
seem hard to come by. Harder still, is a party that openly advocates increased contact and 
cooperation between groups. However, the reduced support for Bosniac and Croat 
“hardliner” parties is a positive sign of reconciliation, as votes that leave these parties will, 
most probably, either go multi-ethnic or more moderate. All of the above points to a situation 
where there is still a long way to go before dialogue, cooperation and empathy between the 
three groups will bring about a stronger degree of reconciliation. Thus, conclusions with 
respect to both aspects of y1 suggest little progress.  
8.3 Laws – x3 
As mentioned in the election chapter, the findings on this variable accentuate and spell out 
some of the developments found here. This is because the tables allow us to look at different 
kinds of decisions, as well as the use of obstacles for decisions, to assess outcomes, substance 
and ability to overcome transaction costs. With regards to reconciliation, the data are not well 
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suited for a discussion using the theoretical concepts we have available. The political strata – 
at least on the central level, as is the focus here – is somewhat a world of its own. Attempting 
to analyse degree of empathy, cooperation and dialogue that can be seen on this variable, to 
arrive at a conclusion about reconciliation, seems futile. The theoretical concepts of 
reconciliation are more appropriate for variables pertaining to the realms of society where 
ordinary citizens partake. 
The findings in the law-chapter allow us to register developments in the decision-
making abilities of the central government. The tables show that the Parliamentary Assembly 
(PA) of Bosnia and Herzegovina had great trouble making decisions and agreeing on new 
laws in the first five years after the war had ended. Then the PA began passing a substantial 
amount of “new laws” in 2001. This continued until roughly 2005. There were many 
“changes and amendment-laws” during most of these years as well, but at least laws of 
greater substance were also being passed. After 2001-2005, the number of “new laws” 
decreased, with the possible exception of 2009, when 18 such laws were passed. From 2009 
and onwards, the trend has been for almost no “new laws” to be passed. The passed laws after 
2009 were mostly “changes and amendments-laws”. If we view the second table in the 
chapter in light of the first, the picture becomes both clearer and more informative. The veto 
mechanism of Entity Voting was used extensively between 2001 and 2010. After 2010, there 
has been almost no use of Entity Voting. The Vital National Interest (VNI), another of the 
veto mechanisms, has not been as extensively used, but when it was used, it was between 
2004 and 2007.  
The picture painted by these two tables is one where political agents have, through 
time, gotten to know the political play and each other quite well. They are aware of the 
boundaries of what is possible. The fact that scores on all categories decrease, seem to 
suggest a form of political inertia. Relating it to the theoretical framework, the development 
in the passing of both “new laws” and “changes and amendment-laws” suggest that in the 
realm of decision-making, BiH displays a poor state of democratic quality, both in the sense 
of transaction costs and in the sense of democratic outcomes and substance. Paradoxically, 
the decreased use of Entity Voting and Vital National Interest-clause supports this 
conclusion. Normally, a decreased use of veto-mechanisms suggests greater agreement, so 
that decisions can be made and higher democratic quality can be obtained. However, when in 
addition virtually no new laws are passed, as is the case from 2009-present, the findings tell a 
different story: One of a system that has resigned and stopped trying. The findings in the law-
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chapter support a conclusion that on this area, BiH is suffering from a very low level of 
democratic quality. 
8.4 Schools – x4 
The findings on the school variable would lend itself most readily to a discussion within the 
framework of reconciliation. Some comments about how the findings stand in relation to the 
democracy-concept will also be provided. 
Students in primary education are still children or young adolescents. Their minds are 
malleable. As well as giving information about the level of reconciliation, this indicator also 
seems to constitute a background for saying something about reconciliation the future. The 
kids in primary education now will be tomorrow’s grown-ups – with whatever perceptions 
about other groups they have received from the parental generation. 
The fact that Brcko has introduced an integrated education system is a step in a 
reconciliatory direction. Brcko can serve as a form of role model, proving that it is possible to 
have integrated schools. This however, demands political will. The fact that the political will 
for integration seem to be lacking proves that education is still an area imbued with symbolic 
meaning and strategic importance for ethno-nationalist agents in various levels of society. 
Little development in the direction of empathy, cooperation and dialogue, and thus 
reconciliation, can be discerned. I would argue that the most important finding in this project 
is that physical segregation of school children seems to be the norm in any community where 
ethnic groups need to share a school. This leads me to a negative conclusion about the degree 
of reconciliation for this variable. As noted in the chapter itself, there has been progress in 
relation to curricula. Offensive material has been taken out. Textbooks have been revised to 
make curricula on contentious issues more uniform. This seems to be steps in the direction of 
reconciliation. Without it, the education system of Bosnia and Herzegovina can never achieve 
integration. However, the fact that primary schools continue to separate children physically is 
a finding grave enough to argue that the degree of reconciliation on this variable is quite low. 
The findings of this variable are not measured longitudinally. However, the interviewees all 
underlined the lack of progress. The physical separation of children in schools is more or less 
the same now as ten or even fifteen years ago. Thus, although there are reconciliatory 
findings in the area of curricula, the degree of reconciliation on this area seem to be low. Not 
much empathy, dialogue or cooperation can happen between children (or their parents) when 
there is lack of interaction at all. 
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 With regards to the concept of democracy, it can be noted that separate curricula – 
which is still present, although less now than before the new laws at the beginning of the 
2000´nds – as well as physical separation, impairs equal access to information. Reiterating 
the above, this is one of the criteria of democratic quality found in the theory chapter. As 
such, separation of curricula as well as physical segregation of children in BiH schools is a 
problem for democratic quality as well as for degree of reconciliation. 
A word of caveat at the end: The conclusions above are the most uncertain in this thesis. 
My sources were all given the task of providing me with an overview that was national in 
scope. My conclusions are based on their assessments, as there are no aggregate data to be 
found on this area. There are, no doubt, local communities that can be found with physical 
interaction between kids of different ethnic groups, thanks to valuable work of local as well 
as international NGO´s, and/or parents groups. Such work would be evidence of real life, real 
time reconciliatory work. Such work would also not have been captured by the assessments 
of my interviewees, as they were merely reporting the dominating tendencies. In other words: 
My conclusions are based on very broad assessments from interviews. In light of the above, 
the findings on this variable could suffer from validity problems. 
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9 Conclusion 
I have now gathered and analysed data on four variables, in order to assess developments in 
democratic quality and degree of reconciliation in Bosnia Herzegovina since 1995. Three 
indicators have been measured longitudinally, the last has been measured with focus on latter 
years. What conclusions can be drawn from the discussion above?  
Carving up the picture conceptually, we could conclude that in the variables most 
pertaining to everyday life (schools –x3 and minority returns – x1), suggests a picture where 
the trend since the war has been that not much alternative information comes through in the 
communities where people live, so that narratives largely remain unchallenged. Moreover, 
this seems to start early, as (most) children in largely heterogeneous communities are 
educated separately. These two conclusions suggest a poor development in terms of 
reconciliation. In addition, it shows a stagnant to negative development for one of the 
requirements with regards to democratic quality: Access to alternative information. 
Regarding the two variables that pertain most to the workings of the central 
government, the developments show a decreasing trend when it comes to the ability to pass 
laws. Granted, the period roughly between 2000 and 2006 showed positive development, but 
since then, the amount of laws of all categories passed have dropped dramatically. This is the 
most serious finding of all when it comes to democratic quality. On this area, the conclusion 
is clear an unequivocal; this is a negative trend when it comes to the ability of the central 
government to deliver democratic quality to its citizens.  
With regards to the election variable, a somewhat declining trend for voting 
nationalistic – with an exception for Serb voters – can be discerned. However, the fact that 
many of the wartime parties are as nationalistic as ever, and the fact that nationalistic parties 
still gather this large a ratio of the grand national totals, suggests a development with regards 
to reconciliation which is stagnant at best. Because it is reasonable to expect nationalism to 
decline after a period where it has flourished, the development, vis a vis this expectation, can 
also be claimed to be negative, with lowered degrees of reconciliation.  
Another way to carve up the image is to use the two concepts of y1. Regarding 
reconciliation, it seems possible to conclude, somewhat metaphorically, that the development 
has consisted of reluctant tolerance instead of cooperation. Instead of empathy there has 
formed a tendency to keeps one´s distance, and instead of dialogue there has been a long 
period of reiterating one´s ethnic discourse loudly, without listening, Regarding democratic 
quality, the all-encompassing, pressing issues that citizens of BiH need solving have, for 
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many years, not been addressed. The ability to pass laws, albeit experiencing a positive trend 
for some time, has gone down drastically. Political elites have, through the 18 years since the 
war, succeeded with the tactic of playing the ethnic card to reap electoral support. When in 
power, however, they fail to deliver democracy - other than in the procedural sense - to their 
voters. In such a light, the February 2014 unrest makes perfect sense. I see it, above all, as an 
outcry for democratic substance. The urge for such substance evidently formed a basis for 
action that transcended the division lines pointed to by the above results pertaining to 
reconciliation. As such, even a thesis as full of distressing material as this, can at least end on 
a happy note.  
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See next page.  	  
